The Meaning of "Negative Phenomena" in Kierkegaard's Theory of Subjectivity

TY - CHAP

T1 - The Meaning of "Negative Phenomena" in Kierkegaard's Theory of Subjectivity

AU - González, Darío David

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - In one of his earliest autobiographical notes, Kierkegaard introduces what can be considered as a programmatic principle for his whole philosophical oeuvre: The crucial thing is to f nd a truth that is truth for me, to f nd the idea for which I am willing to live and die. Of what use would it be to me to discover a so-called objective truth... Of what use would it be to me for truth to stand before me, cold and naked, not caring whether or not I acknowledged it, making me uneasy rather than trustingly receptive. I certainly do not deny that I still accept an imperative of knowledge and that through it men may be inf uenced, but then it must come alive in me, and this is what I now recognize as the most important of all. (JP 5100/ SKS 17, 24) "Only then," he adds in the margin, "does one have an inner experience" (JP 5100/SKS 17, 24). It is certainly not diff cult to comprehend those sentences against the background of the opposition between objective and subjective thinking, as some of the pseudonyms def ne it in later writings. Another interesting way to put the same problem, however, would be to investigate how the product of a certain "imperative of knowledge," how the possible object of a general knowledge, can become the content of an "inner experience." What is true "for me," Kierkegaard seems to tell us, must constitute itself as a truth within the sphere of an ethical relationship: "What I really need is to get clear about what I am to do, not what I must know, except insofar as knowledge must precede every act. What matters is to f nd my purpose, to see what it really is that God wills that I shall do..." (JP 5100/SKS 17, 24). Nine years after the redaction of this journal entry, the same motif reappears in two parallel, albeit distinct, contexts. On the one hand, at the beginning of the third series of upbuilding discourses from 1844, Kierkegaard opposes the "indifferent" character of objective truth to what he calls a "concerned truth" (EUD, 233/SKS 5, 233), that is, a truth that is addressed to a human being as an individual: a truth - we might say - that takes into account the contingency of the individual's ethical existence. On the other hand, in the section of The Concept of Anxiety devoted to "the demonic" or "anxiety about the good," the pseudonymous author describes the situation in which "truth" fails to constitute itself as a truth "for" the individual. After mentioning a series of attitudes towards the religious - "arbitrariness," "unbelief," "mockery of religion," "superstition," "servility, " "sanctimoniousness" - he concludes: "The negative phenomena lack certitude precisely because they are in anxiety about the content" (CA, 139/SKS 4, 431). This characterization of "negative phenomena" offers the interest of pointing to the ethical determination of individual life as the fundamental condition for the constitution of an existential truth. It is worth noting that, in The Concept of Anxiety, the very discussion of the phenomenon of the demonic takes place in the intersection of two series of philosophical questions concerning, respectively, the experience of truth and the experience of freedom: "viewed intellectually, the content of freedom is truth, and truth makes man free. For this reason, truth is the work of freedom, and in such a way that freedom constantly brings forth truth" (CA, 138/ SKS 4, 439). In fact, this is one of the passages in which Kierkegaard comes closest to a determination of his theory of existence as a phenomenology of freedom. Its most important presupposition is succinctly indicated in the same paragraph: "truth is for the particular individual only as he himself produces it in action" (CA, 138/SKS 4, 439; my emphasis). As we will attempt to show, the thesis concerning the "negative" character of the experiences that "are in anxiety about the content" can be explained as a development of this formula on two parallel levels. Firstly, the truth that is not truth in itself but only truth "for the particular individual" is "produced" within the individual's experience of his or her own existence as untruth. Secondly, the "action" in which the individual experiences his or her own freedom, insofar as its "content" (i.e., its truth) can paradoxically be something other than truth, is determined as the real possibility of unfreedom.

AB - In one of his earliest autobiographical notes, Kierkegaard introduces what can be considered as a programmatic principle for his whole philosophical oeuvre: The crucial thing is to f nd a truth that is truth for me, to f nd the idea for which I am willing to live and die. Of what use would it be to me to discover a so-called objective truth... Of what use would it be to me for truth to stand before me, cold and naked, not caring whether or not I acknowledged it, making me uneasy rather than trustingly receptive. I certainly do not deny that I still accept an imperative of knowledge and that through it men may be inf uenced, but then it must come alive in me, and this is what I now recognize as the most important of all. (JP 5100/ SKS 17, 24) "Only then," he adds in the margin, "does one have an inner experience" (JP 5100/SKS 17, 24). It is certainly not diff cult to comprehend those sentences against the background of the opposition between objective and subjective thinking, as some of the pseudonyms def ne it in later writings. Another interesting way to put the same problem, however, would be to investigate how the product of a certain "imperative of knowledge," how the possible object of a general knowledge, can become the content of an "inner experience." What is true "for me," Kierkegaard seems to tell us, must constitute itself as a truth within the sphere of an ethical relationship: "What I really need is to get clear about what I am to do, not what I must know, except insofar as knowledge must precede every act. What matters is to f nd my purpose, to see what it really is that God wills that I shall do..." (JP 5100/SKS 17, 24). Nine years after the redaction of this journal entry, the same motif reappears in two parallel, albeit distinct, contexts. On the one hand, at the beginning of the third series of upbuilding discourses from 1844, Kierkegaard opposes the "indifferent" character of objective truth to what he calls a "concerned truth" (EUD, 233/SKS 5, 233), that is, a truth that is addressed to a human being as an individual: a truth - we might say - that takes into account the contingency of the individual's ethical existence. On the other hand, in the section of The Concept of Anxiety devoted to "the demonic" or "anxiety about the good," the pseudonymous author describes the situation in which "truth" fails to constitute itself as a truth "for" the individual. After mentioning a series of attitudes towards the religious - "arbitrariness," "unbelief," "mockery of religion," "superstition," "servility, " "sanctimoniousness" - he concludes: "The negative phenomena lack certitude precisely because they are in anxiety about the content" (CA, 139/SKS 4, 431). This characterization of "negative phenomena" offers the interest of pointing to the ethical determination of individual life as the fundamental condition for the constitution of an existential truth. It is worth noting that, in The Concept of Anxiety, the very discussion of the phenomenon of the demonic takes place in the intersection of two series of philosophical questions concerning, respectively, the experience of truth and the experience of freedom: "viewed intellectually, the content of freedom is truth, and truth makes man free. For this reason, truth is the work of freedom, and in such a way that freedom constantly brings forth truth" (CA, 138/ SKS 4, 439). In fact, this is one of the passages in which Kierkegaard comes closest to a determination of his theory of existence as a phenomenology of freedom. Its most important presupposition is succinctly indicated in the same paragraph: "truth is for the particular individual only as he himself produces it in action" (CA, 138/SKS 4, 439; my emphasis). As we will attempt to show, the thesis concerning the "negative" character of the experiences that "are in anxiety about the content" can be explained as a development of this formula on two parallel levels. Firstly, the truth that is not truth in itself but only truth "for the particular individual" is "produced" within the individual's experience of his or her own existence as untruth. Secondly, the "action" in which the individual experiences his or her own freedom, insofar as its "content" (i.e., its truth) can paradoxically be something other than truth, is determined as the real possibility of unfreedom.

M3 - Book chapter

SN - 978-0-8101-2681-7

SP - 149

EP - 166

BT - Kierkegaard as Phenomenologist

A2 - Hanson, Jeffrey

PB - Northwestern University Press

ER -