Abstract
Kierkegaard's interest in hereditary sin as a consequence of the Fall is due to the fact that it compromises freedom. If sin is inherited from one's parents, it arises within the individual human being as a determined necessity, and not as an individual act of freedom, and consequently the individual cannot be said to be culpable for his or her own sin. In section 1 the essay shows that Kierkegaard's theological anthropological thought focuses on the notion of hereditary sin from the very outset of his work. In section 2 it is argued, that Vigilius Haufniensis, the pseudonymous author of The Concept of Anxiety, rejects the conception of hereditary sin as it is understood in the Augustinian-Lutheran dogmatic tradition. In section 3 the article demonstrates that Vigilius Haufniensis replaces the traditional notion of hereditary sin with his own interpretation of original sin as a qualitative leap in each individual human being's own life caused neither of necessity nor by accident. Further, sin enters the world in anxiety, and anxiety enters the world because sin in turn brings anxiety with it. For Vigilius Haufniensis anxiety is a useful intermediate term because of its ambiguity; thus the fact that sin comes into the world in anxiety means that it is neither caused by an arbitrary, accidental decision nor by necessity. It is a basic condition of human existence.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Tidsskrift | Tijdschrift voor Filosofie |
Vol/bind | 72/2010 |
Sider (fra-til) | 131-146 |
Antal sider | 15 |
ISSN | 1370-575X |
Status | Udgivet - 2010 |