The intentional stance and cultural learning: a developmental feedback loop

TY - CHAP

T1 - The intentional stance and cultural learning

T2 - a developmental feedback loop

AU - Michael, John Andrew

N1 - Response by Daniel Dennett, pp: 216-218

PY - 2015/1/1

Y1 - 2015/1/1

N2 - In this paper, I propose a developmental explanation of the reliability of the intentional stance as an interpretive strategy, and by doing so counter an objection to Dennett’s intentional stance theory (i.e.the ‘If it isn’t true, why does it work?’ objection). Specifically, young children’s use of the intentional stance enables them to learn from and thereby to become more similar to the adults in their culture. Asa result, they themselves become increasingly intelligible to other people taking the intentional stance.Thus, the intentional stance and cultural learning constitute a feedback loop that (partially) explainsthe reliability of the intentional stance, and does so – contra Dennett’s realist critics – without appealing to a realist interpretation of the descriptions speakers attach to intentional terms. However, I also suggest that this developmental perspective provides grist to the mill for acausal realist interpretation of the reference of intentional terms, insofar the causal interaction between intentional interpretations of behavior and cognitive development provides an anchor that links intentional terms to functional and/or neural processes. Importantly, causal (as opposed to descriptive) theories of reference make it possible to argue that intentional discourse can be referentially anchored to thecausal machinery that produces behavior without generating true descriptions of it. I conclude by drawing out some consequences of the developmental perspective for the way in which we conceptualize the assumption of rationality that is at the core of the intentional stance theory.

AB - In this paper, I propose a developmental explanation of the reliability of the intentional stance as an interpretive strategy, and by doing so counter an objection to Dennett’s intentional stance theory (i.e.the ‘If it isn’t true, why does it work?’ objection). Specifically, young children’s use of the intentional stance enables them to learn from and thereby to become more similar to the adults in their culture. Asa result, they themselves become increasingly intelligible to other people taking the intentional stance.Thus, the intentional stance and cultural learning constitute a feedback loop that (partially) explainsthe reliability of the intentional stance, and does so – contra Dennett’s realist critics – without appealing to a realist interpretation of the descriptions speakers attach to intentional terms. However, I also suggest that this developmental perspective provides grist to the mill for acausal realist interpretation of the reference of intentional terms, insofar the causal interaction between intentional interpretations of behavior and cognitive development provides an anchor that links intentional terms to functional and/or neural processes. Importantly, causal (as opposed to descriptive) theories of reference make it possible to argue that intentional discourse can be referentially anchored to thecausal machinery that produces behavior without generating true descriptions of it. I conclude by drawing out some consequences of the developmental perspective for the way in which we conceptualize the assumption of rationality that is at the core of the intentional stance theory.

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-17374-0_9

DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-17374-0_9

M3 - Book chapter

SN - 9783319173733

T3 - Studies in Brain and Mind Series

SP - 163

EP - 183

BT - Content and Consciousness revisited

A2 - Carlos, Muñoz-Suárez

A2 - Felipe De , Brigard

PB - Springer

CY - Cham

ER -