The Evolution of Social Learning and its Economic Consequences

Benjamin Bossan; Ole Jann; Peter Hammerstein

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2015.01.010

The Evolution of Social Learning and its Economic Consequences

Benjamin Bossan, Ole Jann, Peter Hammerstein

9 Citationer (Scopus)

Abstract

We use an evolutionary model to simulate agents who choose between two options with stochastically varying payoffs. Two types of agents are considered: individual learners, who rely on trial-and-error methods, and social learners, who imitate the wealthiest sampled individual. Agents adapt to changing environments within one generation by using their respective learning strategy. The frequency of the agent types adapts between generations according to the agents' acquired wealth. During the course of evolution, social learning becomes dominant, resulting in three major effects: First, for better or worse, the decisions of social learners are more exaggerated than those of individual learners. Second, social learners react with a delay to changes in the environment. Third, the behavior of social learners becomes more and more detached from reality. We argue that our model gives insights into economic systems and markets.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Tidsskrift	Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Vol/bind	112
Sider (fra-til)	266-288
ISSN	0167-2681
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2015.01.010
Status	Udgivet - 1 apr. 2015

Emneord

Det Samfundsvidenskabelige Fakultet

Adgang til dokumentet

10.1016/j.jebo.2015.01.010

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268115000335

Citationsformater

@article{3a3915d321f740beb9341f8aded8046f,

title = "The Evolution of Social Learning and its Economic Consequences",

abstract = "We use an evolutionary model to simulate agents who choose between two options with stochastically varying payoffs. Two types of agents are considered: individual learners, who rely on trial-and-error methods, and social learners, who imitate the wealthiest sampled individual. Agents adapt to changing environments within one generation by using their respective learning strategy. The frequency of the agent types adapts between generations according to the agents' acquired wealth. During the course of evolution, social learning becomes dominant, resulting in three major effects: First, for better or worse, the decisions of social learners are more exaggerated than those of individual learners. Second, social learners react with a delay to changes in the environment. Third, the behavior of social learners becomes more and more detached from reality. We argue that our model gives insights into economic systems and markets.",

keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, Evolution, learning strategies, market inefficiencies, imitation, natural selection",

author = "Benjamin Bossan and Ole Jann and Peter Hammerstein",

year = "2015",

month = apr,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1016/j.jebo.2015.01.010",

language = "English",

volume = "112",

pages = "266--288",

journal = "Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization",

issn = "0167-2681",

publisher = "Elsevier",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Evolution of Social Learning and its Economic Consequences

AU - Bossan, Benjamin

AU - Jann, Ole

AU - Hammerstein, Peter

PY - 2015/4/1

Y1 - 2015/4/1

N2 - We use an evolutionary model to simulate agents who choose between two options with stochastically varying payoffs. Two types of agents are considered: individual learners, who rely on trial-and-error methods, and social learners, who imitate the wealthiest sampled individual. Agents adapt to changing environments within one generation by using their respective learning strategy. The frequency of the agent types adapts between generations according to the agents' acquired wealth. During the course of evolution, social learning becomes dominant, resulting in three major effects: First, for better or worse, the decisions of social learners are more exaggerated than those of individual learners. Second, social learners react with a delay to changes in the environment. Third, the behavior of social learners becomes more and more detached from reality. We argue that our model gives insights into economic systems and markets.

AB - We use an evolutionary model to simulate agents who choose between two options with stochastically varying payoffs. Two types of agents are considered: individual learners, who rely on trial-and-error methods, and social learners, who imitate the wealthiest sampled individual. Agents adapt to changing environments within one generation by using their respective learning strategy. The frequency of the agent types adapts between generations according to the agents' acquired wealth. During the course of evolution, social learning becomes dominant, resulting in three major effects: First, for better or worse, the decisions of social learners are more exaggerated than those of individual learners. Second, social learners react with a delay to changes in the environment. Third, the behavior of social learners becomes more and more detached from reality. We argue that our model gives insights into economic systems and markets.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - Evolution

KW - learning strategies

KW - market inefficiencies

KW - imitation

KW - natural selection

U2 - 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.01.010

DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.01.010

M3 - Journal article

SN - 0167-2681

VL - 112

SP - 266

EP - 288

JO - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

ER -

The Evolution of Social Learning and its Economic Consequences

Abstract

Emneord

Adgang til dokumentet

Fingeraftryk

Citationsformater