Abstract
During the financial crisis, G20 countries compelled tax havens to sign bilateral treaties providing for exchange of bank information. Policymakers have celebrated this global initiative as the end of bank secrecy. Exploiting a unique panel dataset, our study is the first attempt to assess how the treaties affected bank deposits in tax havens. Rather than repatriating funds, our results suggest that tax evaders shifted deposits to havens not covered by a treaty with their home country. The crackdown thus caused a relocation of deposits at the benefit of the least compliant havens. We discuss the policy implications of these findings.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
---|---|
Tidsskrift | American Economic Journal: Economic Policy |
Vol/bind | 6 |
Udgave nummer | 1 |
Sider (fra-til) | 65-91 |
Antal sider | 27 |
ISSN | 1945-7731 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - 2014 |