The electoral consequences of corruption scandals in Spain

Pedro Riera; Pablo Barberá; Raúl Gómez; Juan Antonio Mayoral Diaz-Asensio; José Ramón Montero

doi:10.1007/s10611-013-9479-1

The electoral consequences of corruption scandals in Spain

Pedro Riera, Pablo Barberá, Raúl Gómez^*, Juan Antonio Mayoral Diaz-Asensio, José Ramón Montero

^*Corresponding author af dette arbejde

5 Citationer (Scopus)

Abstract

Previous studies of the electoral consequences of corruption in Spanish local elections (Jiménez Revista de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociológicas, 6(2):43-76, 2007; Fernández-Vázquez and Rivero 2011, Consecuencias electorales de la corrupción, 2003-2007. Estudios de Progreso, Fundación Alternativas; Costas et al. European Journal of Political Economy: 28(4):469-484, 2012) have found that voters do not necessarily punish corrupt mayors. As has been pointed out in the comparative literature, the average loss of electoral support by corrupt incumbents is small and does not prevent their reelection most of the times (Jiménez and Caínzos 2006, How far and why do corruption scandals cost votes? In Garrard, J. and Newell, J. (eds.) Scandals in past and contemporary politics. Manchester: Manchester University Press). What remains unsolved, however, is the remarkable variability in this pattern. This article explores some of the micro-level variables that may mediate the effect of corruption scandal on the votes. We focus on three factors: ideological closeness to the incumbent party, political sophistication, and employment status. Our results provide only partial support for our hypotheses, suggesting that the effects of corruption are much more complex than what may seem at first sight.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Tidsskrift	Crime, Law and Social Change
Vol/bind	60
Udgave nummer	5
Sider (fra-til)	515-534
Antal sider	20
ISSN	0925-4994
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-013-9479-1
Status	Udgivet - 1 dec. 2013
Udgivet eksternt	Ja

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10.1007/s10611-013-9479-1

http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84888436409&partnerID=8YFLogxK

Citationsformater

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title = "The electoral consequences of corruption scandals in Spain",

abstract = "Previous studies of the electoral consequences of corruption in Spanish local elections (Jim{\'e}nez Revista de Investigaciones Pol{\'i}ticas y Sociol{\'o}gicas, 6(2):43-76, 2007; Fern{\'a}ndez-V{\'a}zquez and Rivero 2011, Consecuencias electorales de la corrupci{\'o}n, 2003-2007. Estudios de Progreso, Fundaci{\'o}n Alternativas; Costas et al. European Journal of Political Economy: 28(4):469-484, 2012) have found that voters do not necessarily punish corrupt mayors. As has been pointed out in the comparative literature, the average loss of electoral support by corrupt incumbents is small and does not prevent their reelection most of the times (Jim{\'e}nez and Ca{\'i}nzos 2006, How far and why do corruption scandals cost votes? In Garrard, J. and Newell, J. (eds.) Scandals in past and contemporary politics. Manchester: Manchester University Press). What remains unsolved, however, is the remarkable variability in this pattern. This article explores some of the micro-level variables that may mediate the effect of corruption scandal on the votes. We focus on three factors: ideological closeness to the incumbent party, political sophistication, and employment status. Our results provide only partial support for our hypotheses, suggesting that the effects of corruption are much more complex than what may seem at first sight.",

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AU - Riera, Pedro

AU - Barberá, Pablo

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AU - Mayoral Diaz-Asensio, Juan Antonio

AU - Montero, José Ramón

PY - 2013/12/1

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N2 - Previous studies of the electoral consequences of corruption in Spanish local elections (Jiménez Revista de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociológicas, 6(2):43-76, 2007; Fernández-Vázquez and Rivero 2011, Consecuencias electorales de la corrupción, 2003-2007. Estudios de Progreso, Fundación Alternativas; Costas et al. European Journal of Political Economy: 28(4):469-484, 2012) have found that voters do not necessarily punish corrupt mayors. As has been pointed out in the comparative literature, the average loss of electoral support by corrupt incumbents is small and does not prevent their reelection most of the times (Jiménez and Caínzos 2006, How far and why do corruption scandals cost votes? In Garrard, J. and Newell, J. (eds.) Scandals in past and contemporary politics. Manchester: Manchester University Press). What remains unsolved, however, is the remarkable variability in this pattern. This article explores some of the micro-level variables that may mediate the effect of corruption scandal on the votes. We focus on three factors: ideological closeness to the incumbent party, political sophistication, and employment status. Our results provide only partial support for our hypotheses, suggesting that the effects of corruption are much more complex than what may seem at first sight.

AB - Previous studies of the electoral consequences of corruption in Spanish local elections (Jiménez Revista de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociológicas, 6(2):43-76, 2007; Fernández-Vázquez and Rivero 2011, Consecuencias electorales de la corrupción, 2003-2007. Estudios de Progreso, Fundación Alternativas; Costas et al. European Journal of Political Economy: 28(4):469-484, 2012) have found that voters do not necessarily punish corrupt mayors. As has been pointed out in the comparative literature, the average loss of electoral support by corrupt incumbents is small and does not prevent their reelection most of the times (Jiménez and Caínzos 2006, How far and why do corruption scandals cost votes? In Garrard, J. and Newell, J. (eds.) Scandals in past and contemporary politics. Manchester: Manchester University Press). What remains unsolved, however, is the remarkable variability in this pattern. This article explores some of the micro-level variables that may mediate the effect of corruption scandal on the votes. We focus on three factors: ideological closeness to the incumbent party, political sophistication, and employment status. Our results provide only partial support for our hypotheses, suggesting that the effects of corruption are much more complex than what may seem at first sight.

KW - Spain

KW - Local elections

KW - Corruption

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The electoral consequences of corruption scandals in Spain

Abstract

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