TY - JOUR
T1 - Strategic campaigns and redistributive politics
AU - Schultz, Christian
N1 - JEL Classification: D72, H23, P16
PY - 2007
Y1 - 2007
N2 - The article investigates strategic, informative campaigning by two parties when politics concern redistribution. Voters are uncertain about whether parties favour special groups. Parties will target campaigns on groups where most votes are gained by informing about policies. In equilibrium, campaigning will be most intensive in groups where the uncertainty is largest and where voters are most mobile, most likely to vote, most receptive to campaigns and relatively uninformed initially. These groups will become more informed about policy. Parties will therefore gain more votes by treating these groups well so these groups will gain from strategic campaigning. Welfare effects are assessed
AB - The article investigates strategic, informative campaigning by two parties when politics concern redistribution. Voters are uncertain about whether parties favour special groups. Parties will target campaigns on groups where most votes are gained by informing about policies. In equilibrium, campaigning will be most intensive in groups where the uncertainty is largest and where voters are most mobile, most likely to vote, most receptive to campaigns and relatively uninformed initially. These groups will become more informed about policy. Parties will therefore gain more votes by treating these groups well so these groups will gain from strategic campaigning. Welfare effects are assessed
U2 - 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02073.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02073.x
M3 - Journal article
SN - 0013-0133
VL - 117
SP - 936
EP - 963
JO - The Economic Journal
JF - The Economic Journal
IS - 522
ER -