Stein and Honneth on Empathy and Emotional Recognition

James Alexander Jardine

doi:10.1007/s10746-015-9361-5

Stein and Honneth on Empathy and Emotional Recognition

James Alexander Jardine

Institut for Kommunikation

7 Citationer (Scopus)

323 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

My aim in this paper is to make use of Edith Stein’s phenomenological analyses of empathy, emotion, and personhood to clarify and critically assess the recent suggestion by Axel Honneth that a basic form of recognition is affective in nature. I will begin by considering Honneth’s own presentation of this claim in his discussion of the role of affect in recognitive gestures, as well as in his notion of ‘elementary recognition,’ arguing that while his account contains much of value it also generates problems. On the basis of this analysis, I will try to show that Stein’s account of empathy demarcates an elementary form of recognition in a less problematic fashion than does Honneth’s own treatment of this issue. I will then spell out the consequences of this move for the emotional recognition thesis, arguing that Stein’s treatment lends it further credence, before ending with some remarks on the connection between recognition and emotional personality.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Tidsskrift	Human Studies
Sider (fra-til)	1-23
Antal sider	23
ISSN	0163-8548
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-015-9361-5
Status	Udgivet - 1 dec. 2015

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10.1007/s10746-015-9361-5

Stein and Honneth on Empathy and Emotional Recognition - online postprintAccepteret manuskript, 300 KB

Citationsformater

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Stein and Honneth on Empathy and Emotional Recognition

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