TY - JOUR
T1 - Simple Unawareness in Dynamic Psychological Games
AU - Nielsen, Carsten Søren
AU - Sebald, Alexander Christopher
PY - 2017/1
Y1 - 2017/1
N2 - Building on Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009)’s framework of dynamic psychological games and the progress in the modeling of dynamic unawareness by Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013a) we model and analyze the impact of asymmetric awareness in the strategic interaction of players motivated by reciprocity and guilt. Specifically we characterize extensive-form games with psychological payoffs and simple unawareness, define extensive-form rationalizability and, using this, show that unawareness has a pervasive impact on the strategic interaction of psychologically motivated players. Intuitively, unawareness influences players’ beliefs concerning, for example, the intentions and expectations of others which in turn impacts their behavior.
AB - Building on Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009)’s framework of dynamic psychological games and the progress in the modeling of dynamic unawareness by Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013a) we model and analyze the impact of asymmetric awareness in the strategic interaction of players motivated by reciprocity and guilt. Specifically we characterize extensive-form games with psychological payoffs and simple unawareness, define extensive-form rationalizability and, using this, show that unawareness has a pervasive impact on the strategic interaction of psychologically motivated players. Intuitively, unawareness influences players’ beliefs concerning, for example, the intentions and expectations of others which in turn impacts their behavior.
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - C72
KW - C73
KW - D80
KW - unawareness
KW - psychological payoffs
KW - extensive-form rationalizability
U2 - 10.1515/bejte-2015-0011
DO - 10.1515/bejte-2015-0011
M3 - Journal article
SN - 2194-6124
VL - 17
SP - 1
EP - 29
JO - The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
JF - The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
IS - 1
ER -