Serving Two Masters: Loyalty Expectations in the European Commission

Caroline Louise Howard Grøn

27 Citationer (Scopus)

Abstract

The paper discusses how civil servants in the European Commission face two

contradictory expectations regarding their loyalty. On the one hand, the Commission

is expected to be an independent arbiter defending the European interest against the

particular interests of member states. On the other hand a number of formal and

informal arrangements ensure national representation. The paper asks the question

how the Commission as an organization deals with this double demand and concludes

that the organization has resorted to a strategy of hypocrisy. The empirical evidence

further suggests that this strategy might be applicable on an institutional level but

that individual civil servants, at least rhetorically primarily sees themselves as

expected to be loyal towards the Commission and the European interest and not

towards national interests.

OriginalsprogEngelsk
Publikationsdato2007
Antal sider28
StatusUdgivet - 2007
BegivenhedEGPA 2007, study group on Ethics and Integrity of Governance - Madrid, Spanien
Varighed: 19 sep. 200721 sep. 2007

Konference

KonferenceEGPA 2007, study group on Ethics and Integrity of Governance
Land/OmrådeSpanien
ByMadrid
Periode19/09/200721/09/2007

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