Sense of agency for movements

Mark Schram Christensen; Thor Grünbaum

doi:10.1016/j.concog.2018.07.002

Sense of agency for movements

Mark Schram Christensen, Thor Grünbaum

8 Citationer (Scopus)

274 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

In this paper, we argue that the comparator model is not a satisfactory model of sense of agency (SoA). We present a theoretical argument and experimental studies. We show (1) most studies of SoA neglect a distinction between SoA associated with movements (narrow SoA) and SoA associated with environmental events (broad SoA); (2) the comparator model emerges from experimental studies of sensory consequences narrowly associated with movements; (3) narrow SoA can be explained by a comparator model, but a motor signal model is simpler and explain narrow SoA equally well; and (4) standard experimental paradigms study only broad SoA. Finally, we present results from two experiments, where we have failed to induce illusory narrow SoA in healthy participants. We believe our experimental approaches should have led to illusory SoA, if the comparator model of SoA was correct. The results challenge proponents of the comparator model of narrow SoA.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Tidsskrift	Consciousness and Cognition
Vol/bind	65
Sider (fra-til)	27-47
Antal sider	21
ISSN	1053-8100
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2018.07.002
Status	Udgivet - okt. 2018

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10.1016/j.concog.2018.07.002

Christensen_Grunbaum_Sense of Agency for Movements_C&C_2018_PrePrintIndsendt manuskript, 2,81 MBLicens: CC BY-NC-ND

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AU - Christensen, Mark Schram

AU - Grünbaum, Thor

PY - 2018/10

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AB - In this paper, we argue that the comparator model is not a satisfactory model of sense of agency (SoA). We present a theoretical argument and experimental studies. We show (1) most studies of SoA neglect a distinction between SoA associated with movements (narrow SoA) and SoA associated with environmental events (broad SoA); (2) the comparator model emerges from experimental studies of sensory consequences narrowly associated with movements; (3) narrow SoA can be explained by a comparator model, but a motor signal model is simpler and explain narrow SoA equally well; and (4) standard experimental paradigms study only broad SoA. Finally, we present results from two experiments, where we have failed to induce illusory narrow SoA in healthy participants. We believe our experimental approaches should have led to illusory SoA, if the comparator model of SoA was correct. The results challenge proponents of the comparator model of narrow SoA.

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DO - 10.1016/j.concog.2018.07.002

M3 - Journal article

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SN - 1053-8100

VL - 65

SP - 27

EP - 47

JO - Consciousness and Cognition

JF - Consciousness and Cognition

ER -

Sense of agency for movements

Abstract

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