Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Sanction Regimes

TY - JOUR

T1 - Self-Organization for Collective Action

T2 - An Experimental Study of Voting on Sanction Regimes

AU - Markussen, Thomas

AU - Putterman, Louis

AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl

N1 - JEL Classification: C92; C91; D03; D71; H41

PY - 2014/1

Y1 - 2014/1

N2 - Entrusting the power to punish to a central authority is a hallmark of civilization, yet informal or horizontal sanctions have attracted more attention of late. We study experimentally a collective action dilemma and test whether subjects choose a formal sanction scheme that costs less than the surplus it makes possible, as predicted by standard economic theory, or instead opt for the use of informal sanctions (IS) or no sanctions. Our subjects choose, and succeed in using, IS surprisingly often, their voting decisions being responsive to the cost of formal sanctions. Adoption by voting enhances the efficiency of both IS and non-deterrent formal sanctions. Results are qualitatively confirmed under several permutations of the experimental design.

AB - Entrusting the power to punish to a central authority is a hallmark of civilization, yet informal or horizontal sanctions have attracted more attention of late. We study experimentally a collective action dilemma and test whether subjects choose a formal sanction scheme that costs less than the surplus it makes possible, as predicted by standard economic theory, or instead opt for the use of informal sanctions (IS) or no sanctions. Our subjects choose, and succeed in using, IS surprisingly often, their voting decisions being responsive to the cost of formal sanctions. Adoption by voting enhances the efficiency of both IS and non-deterrent formal sanctions. Results are qualitatively confirmed under several permutations of the experimental design.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - Formal sanctions

KW - Informal sanctions

KW - Experiment

KW - Voting

KW - Cooperation

KW - Punishment

U2 - 10.1093/restud/rdt022

DO - 10.1093/restud/rdt022

M3 - Journal article

SN - 0034-6527

VL - 81

SP - 301

EP - 324

JO - Review of Economic Studies

JF - Review of Economic Studies

IS - 1

ER -