Requirement-sensitive Legal Moralism: A Critical Assessment

Abstract

Requirement-sensitive legal moralism is a species of legal moralism in which the legitimacy of turning moral into legal demands depends on the existence of a legitimate moral requirement, producing a legitimate social requirement, which can then ground a legitimate legal requirement. Crucially, each step is defeasible by contingent or instrumental, but not intrinsic moral factors. There is no genuinely moral sphere (e.g., a private sphere) in which the law is not to interfere; only contingent, non-moral factors can defeat this. Using William A. Edmundson's Three Anarchical Fallacies as a foil, this idea is spelled out; it is shown why considerations based on the harm principle, consent, and the fact of pluralism do not immediately defeat it, but several problems with Edmundson's account are examined to point out where the idea could be further developed. Journal compilation.

OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftRatio Juris
Vol/bind25
Udgave nummer4
Sider (fra-til)527-554
Antal sider28
ISSN0952-1917
DOI
StatusUdgivet - dec. 2012

Fingeraftryk

Dyk ned i forskningsemnerne om 'Requirement-sensitive Legal Moralism: A Critical Assessment'. Sammen danner de et unikt fingeraftryk.

Citationsformater