Regulating multiple externalities: the case of Nordic fisheries

Staffan Waldo; Frank Jensen; Max Nielsen; Hans Ellefsen; Jónas Hallgrimsson; Cecilia Hammarlund; Oystein Hermansen; John Isaksen

doi:10.1086/685286

Regulating multiple externalities: the case of Nordic fisheries

Staffan Waldo, Frank Jensen, Max Nielsen, Hans Ellefsen, Jónas Hallgrimsson, Cecilia Hammarlund, Oystein Hermansen, John Isaksen

Sektion for Miljø og Naturressourcer

10 Citationer (Scopus)

Abstract

Open access is a well-known externality problem in fisheries causing excess capacity and overfishing. Due to global warming, externality problems from CO2 emissions have gained increased interest. With two externality problems, a first-best optimum can be achieved by using two regulatory instruments. However, solving the open-access externality problem also affects CO2 emissions. By using a bio-economic model covering Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and the Faroe Islands, it is shown that regulations of the open-access externality problem have a large effect on both economic performance and CO2 emissions, while an additional CO2 regulation only has minor effects. The second-best solution achieved by only regulating open access reduces emissions by approximately 50% compared to current fisheries, with the exception of Iceland, which already has a well-developed fisheries management system.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Tidsskrift	Marine Resource Economics
Vol/bind	31
Udgave nummer	2
Sider (fra-til)	233-257
Antal sider	25
ISSN	0738-1360
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1086/685286
Status	Udgivet - 1 apr. 2016

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10.1086/685286

Citationsformater

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abstract = "Open access is a well-known externality problem in fisheries causing excess capacity and overfishing. Due to global warming, externality problems from CO2 emissions have gained increased interest. With two externality problems, a first-best optimum can be achieved by using two regulatory instruments. However, solving the open-access externality problem also affects CO2 emissions. By using a bio-economic model covering Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and the Faroe Islands, it is shown that regulations of the open-access externality problem have a large effect on both economic performance and CO2 emissions, while an additional CO2 regulation only has minor effects. The second-best solution achieved by only regulating open access reduces emissions by approximately 50% compared to current fisheries, with the exception of Iceland, which already has a well-developed fisheries management system.",

keywords = "Climate change, economic efficiency, externalities, fisheries, fuel efficiency, regulation",

author = "Staffan Waldo and Frank Jensen and Max Nielsen and Hans Ellefsen and J{\'o}nas Hallgrimsson and Cecilia Hammarlund and Oystein Hermansen and John Isaksen",

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T1 - Regulating multiple externalities

T2 - the case of Nordic fisheries

AU - Waldo, Staffan

AU - Jensen, Frank

AU - Nielsen, Max

AU - Ellefsen, Hans

AU - Hallgrimsson, Jónas

AU - Hammarlund, Cecilia

AU - Hermansen, Oystein

AU - Isaksen, John

PY - 2016/4/1

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N2 - Open access is a well-known externality problem in fisheries causing excess capacity and overfishing. Due to global warming, externality problems from CO2 emissions have gained increased interest. With two externality problems, a first-best optimum can be achieved by using two regulatory instruments. However, solving the open-access externality problem also affects CO2 emissions. By using a bio-economic model covering Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and the Faroe Islands, it is shown that regulations of the open-access externality problem have a large effect on both economic performance and CO2 emissions, while an additional CO2 regulation only has minor effects. The second-best solution achieved by only regulating open access reduces emissions by approximately 50% compared to current fisheries, with the exception of Iceland, which already has a well-developed fisheries management system.

AB - Open access is a well-known externality problem in fisheries causing excess capacity and overfishing. Due to global warming, externality problems from CO2 emissions have gained increased interest. With two externality problems, a first-best optimum can be achieved by using two regulatory instruments. However, solving the open-access externality problem also affects CO2 emissions. By using a bio-economic model covering Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and the Faroe Islands, it is shown that regulations of the open-access externality problem have a large effect on both economic performance and CO2 emissions, while an additional CO2 regulation only has minor effects. The second-best solution achieved by only regulating open access reduces emissions by approximately 50% compared to current fisheries, with the exception of Iceland, which already has a well-developed fisheries management system.

KW - Climate change

KW - economic efficiency

KW - externalities

KW - fisheries

KW - fuel efficiency

KW - regulation

U2 - 10.1086/685286

DO - 10.1086/685286

M3 - Journal article

SN - 0738-1360

VL - 31

SP - 233

EP - 257

JO - Marine Resource Economics

JF - Marine Resource Economics

IS - 2

ER -

Regulating multiple externalities: the case of Nordic fisheries

Abstract

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