Rationality, expected utility and the precautionary principle

TY - JOUR

T1 - Rationality, expected utility and the precautionary principle

AU - Christiansen, Andreas

PY - 2019/3/1

Y1 - 2019/3/1

N2 - A common objection to the precautionary principle is that it is irrational. I argue that this objection goes beyond the often-discussed claim that the principle is incoherent. Instead, I argue, expected utility theory is the source of several more sophisticated irrationality charges against the precautionary principle. I then defend the principle from these objections by arguing (i) that the relevant features of the precautionary principle are part of plausible normative theories, and (ii) that the precautionary principle does not diverge more from ideal expected utility maximization than non-ideal expected utility maximizing procedures, and may do better in real-world choices.

AB - A common objection to the precautionary principle is that it is irrational. I argue that this objection goes beyond the often-discussed claim that the principle is incoherent. Instead, I argue, expected utility theory is the source of several more sophisticated irrationality charges against the precautionary principle. I then defend the principle from these objections by arguing (i) that the relevant features of the precautionary principle are part of plausible normative theories, and (ii) that the precautionary principle does not diverge more from ideal expected utility maximization than non-ideal expected utility maximizing procedures, and may do better in real-world choices.

U2 - https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2019.1581413

DO - https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2019.1581413

M3 - Journal article

SN - 2155-0085

JO - Ethics, Policy & Environment

JF - Ethics, Policy & Environment

ER -