Questions toward a Peircean phenomenological description of association

Bent Sørensen; Torkild Leo Thellefsen

doi:10.1515/sem-2015-0062

Questions toward a Peircean phenomenological description of association

Bent Sørensen, Torkild Leo Thellefsen

Institut for Kommunikation - Forskning

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Abstract

According to the philosopher and scientist Charles Peirce (1839-1914) phenomenology is fundamental to all scientific inquiry and association is the only force that exists within the intellect. However, Peirce only gave his reader a hint about the relationship between phenomenology and association. In this article we will try to follow that hint and point towards a couple of main questions that can guide a Peircean phenomenological description of association. Hence, the conclusion of the article will not be a phenomenological description of association but rather a couple of main questions trying to determine how such a phenomenological description can begin in the first place. Our hypothesis is that the questions depend for their construction on the inter-relatedness and interdependence of certain central Peircean phenomenological concepts-especially, Thirdness, Secondness, and Firstness.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Tidsskrift	Semiotica
Vol/bind	207
Sider (fra-til)	529-538
Antal sider	10
ISSN	0037-1998
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1515/sem-2015-0062
Status	Udgivet - 1 okt. 2015

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10.1515/sem-2015-0062

sem-2015-0062

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AB - According to the philosopher and scientist Charles Peirce (1839-1914) phenomenology is fundamental to all scientific inquiry and association is the only force that exists within the intellect. However, Peirce only gave his reader a hint about the relationship between phenomenology and association. In this article we will try to follow that hint and point towards a couple of main questions that can guide a Peircean phenomenological description of association. Hence, the conclusion of the article will not be a phenomenological description of association but rather a couple of main questions trying to determine how such a phenomenological description can begin in the first place. Our hypothesis is that the questions depend for their construction on the inter-relatedness and interdependence of certain central Peircean phenomenological concepts-especially, Thirdness, Secondness, and Firstness.

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JF - Semiotica

ER -

Questions toward a Peircean phenomenological description of association

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