Price Competition and Reputation in Markets for Experience goods: An Experimental Study

Steffen Huck, Gabriele Lünser, Jean-Robert Karl Tyran

    13 Citationer (Scopus)

    Abstract

    We experimentally examine the effects of price competition in markets for experience goods where sellers can build up reputations for quality. We compare price competition to monopolistic markets and markets where prices are exogenously fixed. Although oligopolies benefit consumers regardless of whether prices are fixed or endogenously chosen, we find that price competition lowers efficiency as consumers pay too little attention to reputation for quality. This provides empirical support to recent models in behavioral industrial organization that assume that consumers may, with increasing complexity of the marketplace, focus on selected dimensions of products.

    OriginalsprogEngelsk
    TidsskriftRAND Journal of Economics
    Vol/bind47
    Udgave nummer1
    Sider (fra-til)99-117
    ISSN0741-6261
    DOI
    StatusUdgivet - 1 mar. 2016

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