Abstract
What does it take for an individual to be personally responsible for behaviors that lead to increased risks of diseases? We examine three approaches to responsibility that cover the most important aspects of the discussion of responsibility, and spell out what it takes, according to each of them, to be responsible for behaviors leading to increased risks of diseases. We show that only what we call the causal approach can adequately accommodate widely shared intuitions to the effect that certain causal influences, such as genetic make-up or certain social circumstances, diminishes or undermines personal responsibility. However, accepting the causal approach most likely makes personal responsibility impossible. We therefore need either to reject these widely shared intuitions about what counts as responsibility-softening or -undermining, or accept that personal responsibility for behaviors leading to increased risks of diseases rests on premises so shaky that personal responsibility probably is impossible.
| Originalsprog | Engelsk |
|---|---|
| Tidsskrift | Journal of Medicine and Philosophy |
| Vol/bind | 41 |
| Udgave nummer | 5 |
| Sider (fra-til) | 480-499 |
| Antal sider | 20 |
| ISSN | 0360-5310 |
| DOI | |
| Status | Udgivet - 1 okt. 2016 |
Emneord
- Det Humanistiske Fakultet