Mental activity and the sense of ownership

TY - JOUR

T1 - Mental activity and the sense of ownership

AU - Alsmith, Adrian John Tetteh

PY - 2015/12/1

Y1 - 2015/12/1

N2 - I introduce and defend the notion of a cognitive account of the sense of ownership. A cognitive account of the sense of ownership holds that one experiences something as one's own only if one thinks of something as one's own. By contrast, a phenomenal account of the sense of ownership holds that one can experience something as one's own without thinking about anything as one's own. I argue that we have no reason to favour phenomenal accounts over cognitive accounts, that cognitive accounts are plausible given that much of our mental activity has unnoticed effects on our mental life, and that certain illusory experiences of body ownership sometimes described as thought-independent may be best explained as imaginative perceptual experiences.

AB - I introduce and defend the notion of a cognitive account of the sense of ownership. A cognitive account of the sense of ownership holds that one experiences something as one's own only if one thinks of something as one's own. By contrast, a phenomenal account of the sense of ownership holds that one can experience something as one's own without thinking about anything as one's own. I argue that we have no reason to favour phenomenal accounts over cognitive accounts, that cognitive accounts are plausible given that much of our mental activity has unnoticed effects on our mental life, and that certain illusory experiences of body ownership sometimes described as thought-independent may be best explained as imaginative perceptual experiences.

U2 - 10.1007/s13164-014-0208-1

DO - 10.1007/s13164-014-0208-1

M3 - Journal article

SN - 1878-5158

VL - 6

SP - 881

EP - 896

JO - Review of Philosophy and Psychology

JF - Review of Philosophy and Psychology

IS - 4

ER -