Abstract
This article considers the implications of luck egalitarianism for a range of issues relating to international, South-North migration. More specifically, the implications of luck egalitarianism for the question of whether receiving societies are justified in extending to immigrants a less comprehensive set of rights than that enjoyed by other members of society are considered. First, are voluntary migrants responsible for their migration in such a way that receiving societies are justified in extending to them a less comprehensive set of rights than if, say, they had been involuntary migrants, or citizens of the destination country? Since luck egalitarianism aims to redistribute only for inequalities for which individuals are not responsible, there is an issue of whether it will hold individuals responsible for their choice of migration in such a way that it may justify asymmetrical sets of rights between voluntary immigrants and other members of society. Second, it may be possible to allow access for a larger number of disadvantaged migrants if they are granted access to a less extensive package of rights when they reach the destination country than if they were granted access to a more extensive such package. If so, may not the less extensive package of rights turn out to have a greater positive impact on global equality? Both these arguments are critically discussed and it is concluded that neither justifies extending to immigrants a less comprehensive set of rights.
| Originalsprog | Engelsk |
|---|---|
| Tidsskrift | Ratio Juris |
| Vol/bind | 30 |
| Udgave nummer | 2 |
| Sider (fra-til) | 127-43 |
| Antal sider | 17 |
| ISSN | 0952-1917 |
| DOI | |
| Status | Udgivet - jun. 2017 |