Locked-in syndrome: a challenge to standard accounts of selfhood and personhood

TY - JOUR

T1 - Locked-in syndrome: a challenge to standard accounts of selfhood and personhood

AU - Zahavi, Dan

PY - 2020/7/1

Y1 - 2020/7/1

N2 - A point made repeatedly over the last few years is that the Locked-in Syndrome (LIS) offers unique real-life material for revisiting and challenging certain ingrained philosophical assumptions about the nature of personhood and personal identity. Indeed, the claim has been made that a closer study of LIS will call into question some of the traditional conceptions of personhood that primarily highlight the significance of consciousness, self-consciousness and autonomy and suggest the need for a more interpersonal account of the person. I am skeptical about these claims and will in the following argue that the theoretical relevance of LIS for an understanding of selfhood and personhood has been exaggerated.

AB - A point made repeatedly over the last few years is that the Locked-in Syndrome (LIS) offers unique real-life material for revisiting and challenging certain ingrained philosophical assumptions about the nature of personhood and personal identity. Indeed, the claim has been made that a closer study of LIS will call into question some of the traditional conceptions of personhood that primarily highlight the significance of consciousness, self-consciousness and autonomy and suggest the need for a more interpersonal account of the person. I am skeptical about these claims and will in the following argue that the theoretical relevance of LIS for an understanding of selfhood and personhood has been exaggerated.

M3 - Journal article

SN - 1874-5490

JO - Neuroethics

JF - Neuroethics

ER -