Inequality aversion and voting on redistribution

Wolfgang Höchtl; Rupert Sausgruber; Jean-Robert Karl Tyran

doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.07.004

Inequality aversion and voting on redistribution

Wolfgang Höchtl, Rupert Sausgruber, Jean-Robert Karl Tyran

Økonomisk Institut

22 Citationer (Scopus)

Abstract

Some people have a concern for a fair distribution of incomes while others do not. Does such a concern matter for majority voting on redistribution? Fairness preferences are relevant for redistribution outcomes only if fair-minded voters are pivotal. Pivotality, in turn, depends on the structure of income classes. We experimentally study voting on redistribution between two income classes and show that the effect of inequality aversion is asymmetric. Inequality aversion is more likely to matter if the “rich” are in majority. With a “poor” majority, we find that redistribution outcomes look as if all voters were exclusively motivated by self-interest.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Tidsskrift	European Economic Review
Vol/bind	56
Udgave nummer	7
Sider (fra-til)	1406-1421
ISSN	0014-2921
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.07.004
Status	Udgivet - okt. 2012

Emneord

Det Samfundsvidenskabelige Fakultet
Redistribution
Self interest
Inequality aversion
Median voter
Experiment

Adgang til dokumentet

10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.07.004

Citationsformater

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KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - Redistribution

KW - Self interest

KW - Inequality aversion

KW - Median voter

KW - Experiment

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