Ideological Asymmetry in the Reach of Pro-Russian Digital Disinformation to United States Audiences

TY - JOUR

T1 - Ideological Asymmetry in the Reach of Pro-Russian Digital Disinformation to United States Audiences

AU - Hjorth, Frederik Georg

AU - Adler-Nissen, Rebecca

PY - 2019/4/1

Y1 - 2019/4/1

N2 - Despite concerns about the effects of pro-Russian disinformation on Western public opinion, evidence of its reach remains scarce. We hypothesize that conservative individuals will be more likely than liberals to be potentially exposed to pro-Russian disinformation in digital networks. We evaluate the hypothesis using a large data set of U.S.-based Twitter users, testing how ideology is associated with disinformation about the 2014 crash of the MH17 aircraft over eastern Ukraine. We find that potential exposure to disinformation is concentrated among the most conservative individuals. Moving from the most liberal to the most conservative individuals in the sample is associated with a change in the conditional probability of potential exposure to disinformation from 6.5% to 45.2%. We corroborate the finding using a second, validated data set on individual party registration. The results indicate that the reach of online, pro-Russian disinformation into U.S. audiences is distinctly ideologically asymmetric.

AB - Despite concerns about the effects of pro-Russian disinformation on Western public opinion, evidence of its reach remains scarce. We hypothesize that conservative individuals will be more likely than liberals to be potentially exposed to pro-Russian disinformation in digital networks. We evaluate the hypothesis using a large data set of U.S.-based Twitter users, testing how ideology is associated with disinformation about the 2014 crash of the MH17 aircraft over eastern Ukraine. We find that potential exposure to disinformation is concentrated among the most conservative individuals. Moving from the most liberal to the most conservative individuals in the sample is associated with a change in the conditional probability of potential exposure to disinformation from 6.5% to 45.2%. We corroborate the finding using a second, validated data set on individual party registration. The results indicate that the reach of online, pro-Russian disinformation into U.S. audiences is distinctly ideologically asymmetric.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - disinformation

KW - misinformation

KW - fake news

KW - political psychology

KW - Russia

KW - Ukraine

KW - partisan selectivity

KW - ideological asymmetry

KW - communication studies

KW - Political Science

KW - Twitter

KW - social media

KW - social data science

U2 - 10.1093/joc/jqz006

DO - 10.1093/joc/jqz006

M3 - Journal article

SN - 0021-9916

VL - 69

SP - 168

EP - 192

JO - Journal of Communication

JF - Journal of Communication

IS - 2

ER -