Full Security of Quantum Key Distribution From No-Signaling Constraints

L.  Masanes,; R. Renner; Matthias Christandl; Andreas Winter; J. Barrett

doi:10.1109/TIT.2014.2329417

Full Security of Quantum Key Distribution From No-Signaling Constraints

L. Masanes,, R. Renner, Matthias Christandl, Andreas Winter, J. Barrett

25 Citationer (Scopus)

Abstract

We analyze a cryptographic protocol for generating a distributed secret key from correlations that violate a Bell inequality by a sufficient amount, and prove its security against eavesdroppers, constrained only by the assumption that any information accessible to them must be compatible with the non-signaling principle. The claim holds with respect to the state-of-the-art security definition used in cryptography, known as universally-composable security. The non-signaling assumption only refers to the statistics of measurement outcomes depending on the choices of measurements; hence security is independent of the internal workings of the devices - they do not even need to follow the laws of quantum theory. This is relevant for practice as a correct and complete modeling of realistic devices is generally impossible. The techniques developed are general and can be applied to other Bell inequality-based protocols. In particular, we provide a scheme for estimating Bell-inequality violations when the samples are not independent and identically distributed.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Tidsskrift	I E E E Transactions on Information Theory
Vol/bind	60
Udgave nummer	8
Sider (fra-til)	4973-4986
ISSN	0018-9448
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1109/TIT.2014.2329417
Status	Udgivet - aug. 2014
Udgivet eksternt	Ja

Adgang til dokumentet

10.1109/TIT.2014.2329417

Citationsformater

@article{b731a5cb7c20465aa12840ea53716f2c,

title = "Full Security of Quantum Key Distribution From No-Signaling Constraints",

abstract = "We analyze a cryptographic protocol for generating a distributed secret key from correlations that violate a Bell inequality by a sufficient amount, and prove its security against eavesdroppers, constrained only by the assumption that any information accessible to them must be compatible with the non-signaling principle. The claim holds with respect to the state-of-the-art security definition used in cryptography, known as universally-composable security. The non-signaling assumption only refers to the statistics of measurement outcomes depending on the choices of measurements; hence security is independent of the internal workings of the devices - they do not even need to follow the laws of quantum theory. This is relevant for practice as a correct and complete modeling of realistic devices is generally impossible. The techniques developed are general and can be applied to other Bell inequality-based protocols. In particular, we provide a scheme for estimating Bell-inequality violations when the samples are not independent and identically distributed.",

author = "L. Masanes, and R. Renner and Matthias Christandl and Andreas Winter and J. Barrett",

year = "2014",

month = aug,

doi = "10.1109/TIT.2014.2329417",

language = "English",

volume = "60",

pages = "4973--4986",

journal = "I E E E Transactions on Information Theory",

issn = "0018-9448",

publisher = "Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers",

number = "8",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Full Security of Quantum Key Distribution From No-Signaling Constraints

AU - Masanes,, L.

AU - Renner, R.

AU - Christandl, Matthias

AU - Winter, Andreas

AU - Barrett, J.

PY - 2014/8

Y1 - 2014/8

N2 - We analyze a cryptographic protocol for generating a distributed secret key from correlations that violate a Bell inequality by a sufficient amount, and prove its security against eavesdroppers, constrained only by the assumption that any information accessible to them must be compatible with the non-signaling principle. The claim holds with respect to the state-of-the-art security definition used in cryptography, known as universally-composable security. The non-signaling assumption only refers to the statistics of measurement outcomes depending on the choices of measurements; hence security is independent of the internal workings of the devices - they do not even need to follow the laws of quantum theory. This is relevant for practice as a correct and complete modeling of realistic devices is generally impossible. The techniques developed are general and can be applied to other Bell inequality-based protocols. In particular, we provide a scheme for estimating Bell-inequality violations when the samples are not independent and identically distributed.

AB - We analyze a cryptographic protocol for generating a distributed secret key from correlations that violate a Bell inequality by a sufficient amount, and prove its security against eavesdroppers, constrained only by the assumption that any information accessible to them must be compatible with the non-signaling principle. The claim holds with respect to the state-of-the-art security definition used in cryptography, known as universally-composable security. The non-signaling assumption only refers to the statistics of measurement outcomes depending on the choices of measurements; hence security is independent of the internal workings of the devices - they do not even need to follow the laws of quantum theory. This is relevant for practice as a correct and complete modeling of realistic devices is generally impossible. The techniques developed are general and can be applied to other Bell inequality-based protocols. In particular, we provide a scheme for estimating Bell-inequality violations when the samples are not independent and identically distributed.

U2 - 10.1109/TIT.2014.2329417

DO - 10.1109/TIT.2014.2329417

M3 - Journal article

SN - 0018-9448

VL - 60

SP - 4973

EP - 4986

JO - I E E E Transactions on Information Theory

JF - I E E E Transactions on Information Theory

IS - 8

ER -