Eight Arguments against Double Effect

Ezio Di Nucci

Eight Arguments against Double Effect

Abstract

I offer eight arguments against the Doctrine of Double Effect, a normative principle according to which in pursuing the good it is sometimes morally permissible to bring about some evil as a side-effect or merely foreseen consequence: the same evil would not be morally justified as an intended means or end.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Publikationsdato	2014
Antal sider	15
Status	Udgivet - 2014
Begivenhed	Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Philosophie - Münster, Münster, Tyskland Varighed: 28 sep. 2014 → 2 okt. 2014 Konferencens nummer: XXIII.

Konference

Konference	Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Philosophie
Nummer	XXIII.
Lokation	Münster
Land/Område	Tyskland
By	Münster
Periode	28/09/2014 → 02/10/2014

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Citationsformater

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year = "2014",

language = "English",

note = "Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft f{\"u}r Philosophie ; Conference date: 28-09-2014 Through 02-10-2014",

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M3 - Paper

T2 - Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Philosophie

Y2 - 28 September 2014 through 2 October 2014

ER -

Eight Arguments against Double Effect

Abstract

Konference

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Citationsformater