Do Not Trash the Incentive! Monetary Incentives and Waste Sorting

TY - JOUR

T1 - Do Not Trash the Incentive! Monetary Incentives and Waste Sorting

AU - Bucciol, Alessandro

AU - Montinari, Natalia

AU - Piovesan, Marco

N1 - JEL Classification: D01; D78; Q53

PY - 2015/10/1

Y1 - 2015/10/1

N2 - In this paper, we examine whether combining non-monetary and monetary incentives increases municipal solid waste sorting. We empirically investigate this issue, exploiting the exogenous variation in waste management policies experienced during the years 1999-2008 by the 95 municipalities in the district of Treviso (Italy). Using a panel regression analysis, we estimate that pay-as-you-throw (PAYT) incentive schemes increase the sorted-to-total waste ratio by 17 percent, and that their effect reinforces that of a door-to-door (DtD) collection system, which is equal to 15.7 percent. Moreover, the panel structure of our dataset allows us to find learning and spatial effects associated with both PAYT and DtD.

AB - In this paper, we examine whether combining non-monetary and monetary incentives increases municipal solid waste sorting. We empirically investigate this issue, exploiting the exogenous variation in waste management policies experienced during the years 1999-2008 by the 95 municipalities in the district of Treviso (Italy). Using a panel regression analysis, we estimate that pay-as-you-throw (PAYT) incentive schemes increase the sorted-to-total waste ratio by 17 percent, and that their effect reinforces that of a door-to-door (DtD) collection system, which is equal to 15.7 percent. Moreover, the panel structure of our dataset allows us to find learning and spatial effects associated with both PAYT and DtD.

U2 - 10.1111/sjoe.12122

DO - 10.1111/sjoe.12122

M3 - Journal article

SN - 0347-0520

VL - 117

SP - 1204

EP - 1229

JO - Scandinavian Journal of Economics

JF - Scandinavian Journal of Economics

IS - 4

ER -