Disjunctivism and the Urgency of Scepticism

3 Citationer (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper argues that McDowell is right to claim that disjunctivism has anti-sceptical implications. While the disjunctive conception of experience leaves unaffected the Cartesian sceptical challenge, it undermines another type of sceptical challenge. Moreover, the sceptical challenge against which disjunctivism militates has some philosophical urgency in that it threatens the very notion that perceptual experience can acquaint us with the world around us.

OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftPhilosophical Explorations
Vol/bind14
Udgave nummer1
Sider (fra-til)5-21
Antal sider17
ISSN1386-9795
DOI
StatusUdgivet - mar. 2011

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