Das Gewissen als Instanz der Selbsterschließung: Luther, Kierkegaard und Heidegger

Claudia Welz

5 Citationer (Scopus)

Abstract

The article focuses on conscience as an instance of self-disclosure. The article is structured by three questions: First, who or what is performing the disclosure? Second, in what ways is the self-disclosure enacted? And third, what is disclosed about selfhood? These questions are examined with respect to the contributions by Martin Luther, Søren Kierkegaard, and Martin Heidegger. Their works stand in a line of reception and have implications that are theologically and anthropologically relevant. In order to find out how conscience manifests itself in human experience, the texts will be analyzed with regard to (1) the origin and/or subject of disclosing, (2) the mode of disclosure, and (3) the disclosed content. The investigation proceeds in the following steps: Part I is dedicated to the differing descriptions of conscience and introduces the texts of the individual authors. Part II offers a brief comparison of their approaches. Part III is an attempt to formulate and discuss the controversial points. The issues to be discussed are, first, the methodological approach to questions of self-disclosure; second, the definition and evaluation of the aguilta disclosed by conscience; and, third, the understanding of human freedom or unfreedom.

OriginalsprogDansk
TidsskriftNeue Zeitschrift fuer Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie
Vol/bind 53
Udgave nummer3
Sider (fra-til)265-284
ISSN0028-3517
StatusUdgivet - okt. 2011

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