Abstract
As a small, open economy Denmark has a pursued a distinct path of capitalist production that relies heavily on innovation in design, production and administration and, therefore, a deliberate dependency on sophisticated information technology and intellectual property. The state has long since recognised the elevated and persistent risk posed by attacks on crucial information technology infrastructure and industrial espionage for Denmark’s continued prosperity and social stability. This acknowledged heighted threat level contrasts with the somewhat counter-intuitive observation that its citizens seem to evince great trust in the ability of the political and legal institutions to protect them – in sharp contrast to declining and relatively low levels in the large industrial states. With respect to threats posed by industrial espionage and network disruption, the response by the state and business community appears to rely less on penal prosecution than technology-driven and community-supported early warning. The state stresses prevention, detection and technical counter-measures through voluntary cooperation by affected public authorities and private enterprises; only in militarily relevant areas are mandatory measures contemplated. Consequently, Danish authorities have focused on strengthening inner-Danish technical capacities of both public authorities and private companies to detect and insulate against electronic intrusion, rather than collecting litigation-relevant evidence.
| Originalsprog | Engelsk |
|---|---|
| Titel | Economic and Industrial Espionage in Germany and Europe : Vol. 1 Field Description |
| Antal sider | 23 |
| Udgivelsessted | Berlin |
| Forlag | Springer |
| Publikationsdato | 2018 |
| Status | Udgivet - 2018 |
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