TY - JOUR
T1 - Corruption in committees
T2 - An Experimental Study of Information Aggregation through Voting
AU - Morton, Rebecca B.
AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl
PY - 2015
Y1 - 2015
N2 - We investigate experimentally the effects of corrupt experts on information aggregation in committees. We find that nonexperts are significantly less likely to delegate through abstention when there is a probability that experts are corrupt. Such decreased abstention, when the probability of corrupt experts is low, actually increases information efficiency in committee decision-making. However, if the probability of corrupt experts is large, the effect is not sufficient to offset the mechanical effect of decreased information efficiency due to corrupt experts. Our results demonstrate that the norm of "letting the expert decide" in committee voting is influenced by the probability of corrupt experts, and that influence can have, to a limited extent, a positive effect on information efficiency.
AB - We investigate experimentally the effects of corrupt experts on information aggregation in committees. We find that nonexperts are significantly less likely to delegate through abstention when there is a probability that experts are corrupt. Such decreased abstention, when the probability of corrupt experts is low, actually increases information efficiency in committee decision-making. However, if the probability of corrupt experts is large, the effect is not sufficient to offset the mechanical effect of decreased information efficiency due to corrupt experts. Our results demonstrate that the norm of "letting the expert decide" in committee voting is influenced by the probability of corrupt experts, and that influence can have, to a limited extent, a positive effect on information efficiency.
U2 - 10.1111/jpet.12153
DO - 10.1111/jpet.12153
M3 - Journal article
SN - 1097-3923
VL - 17
SP - 553
EP - 579
JO - Journal of Public Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Public Economic Theory
IS - 4
ER -