Consent ain't anything: dissent, access and the conditions for consent

TY - JOUR

T1 - Consent ain't anything

T2 - dissent, access and the conditions for consent

AU - Di Nucci, Ezio

PY - 2016/3/1

Y1 - 2016/3/1

N2 - I argue against various versions of the 'attitude' view of consent and of the 'action' view of consent: I show that neither an attitude nor an action is either necessary or sufficient for consent. I then put forward a different view of consent based on the idea that, given a legitimate epistemic context, absence of dissent is sufficient for consent: what is crucial is having access to dissent. In the latter part of the paper I illustrate my view of consent by applying it to the case of consenting to being an organ donor.

AB - I argue against various versions of the 'attitude' view of consent and of the 'action' view of consent: I show that neither an attitude nor an action is either necessary or sufficient for consent. I then put forward a different view of consent based on the idea that, given a legitimate epistemic context, absence of dissent is sufficient for consent: what is crucial is having access to dissent. In the latter part of the paper I illustrate my view of consent by applying it to the case of consenting to being an organ donor.

KW - Journal Article

U2 - 10.1007/s40592-016-0058-y

DO - 10.1007/s40592-016-0058-y

M3 - Journal article

C2 - 27334378

SN - 1321-2753

VL - 34

SP - 3

EP - 22

JO - Monash Bioethics Review

JF - Monash Bioethics Review

IS - 1

ER -