Competition, cooperation, and collective choice

Thomas Markussen; Ernesto Guillermo Reuben Paris; Jean-Robert Karl Tyran

Competition, cooperation, and collective choice

Thomas Markussen, Ernesto Guillermo Reuben Paris, Jean-Robert Karl Tyran

Abstract

The ability of groups to implement efficiency-enhancing institutions is emerging as a central theme of research in economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular but the electoral outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decides, competition is almost always adopted. If likely losers from competition have veto power, it is often not, and substantial gains in efficiency are foregone.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Udgiver	Department of Economics, University of Economics
Antal sider	50
Status	Udgivet - 2012

Navn	University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online)
Nummer	04
Vol/bind	2012
ISSN	1601-2461

Emneord

Det Samfundsvidenskabelige Fakultet
public goods
competition
tournament
cooperation
Voting

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Citationsformater

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