Competing Auctions of Skills

Abstract

The model of competing sellers McAfee (1993) is applied to a labor market environment with heterogeneous workers, who differ by outside option and skill type, and heterogeneous firms, who differ by the amount of output produced when matched to each possible worker tyoe. We derive both a static and a dynamic version of this model where workers can entertain offers while employed and unemployed. A simple estimated benchmark version of the dynamic model gives a reasonable approximation of the statistical moments of both the aggregate wage and productivity distribution in Denmark. We also use the simple benchmark model to explore further implications of the theory. For example, we find that observed inter-temporal changes in the overall distribution of wages are not predicted by a simple model of no-comparative advantage.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
UdgivelsesstedKbh.
UdgiverCentre for Applied Microeconometrics. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen
Antal sider54
StatusUdgivet - 2014
NavnCAM working papers
Nummer01
Vol/bind2014

Emneord

  • Det Samfundsvidenskabelige Fakultet

Fingeraftryk

Dyk ned i forskningsemnerne om 'Competing Auctions of Skills'. Sammen danner de et unikt fingeraftryk.

Citationsformater