Co-operation as currency: how active coalitions affect lobbying success

TY - JOUR

T1 - Co-operation as currency: how active coalitions affect lobbying success

AU - Junk, Wiebke Marie

PY - 2020/6/2

Y1 - 2020/6/2

N2 - Coalition action is a common lobbying strategy to exert influence over policy,but is rarely addressed in studies of lobbying success. This article adds toresource exchange theory, firstly, that active co-operation with others togather information, optimize strategies and jointly signal a position shouldincrease lobbying success similarly to spending economic resources onlobbying on an issue individually. Secondly, it expects important interactionsbetween active co-operation and economic resources, because the costs andbenefits of co-operation will be distributed unequally among partners whoinvest different levels of resources themselves. Using new survey data onlobbying on 50 policy issues in five European countries, the article providesstrong support for these expectations: Active co-operation on an issueincreases lobbying success measured as perceived influence. Moreover, itmediates the effect of individual economic resources on lobbying success.These findings have important methodological and normative implicationsregarding alternatives pathways of lobbying power.

AB - Coalition action is a common lobbying strategy to exert influence over policy,but is rarely addressed in studies of lobbying success. This article adds toresource exchange theory, firstly, that active co-operation with others togather information, optimize strategies and jointly signal a position shouldincrease lobbying success similarly to spending economic resources onlobbying on an issue individually. Secondly, it expects important interactionsbetween active co-operation and economic resources, because the costs andbenefits of co-operation will be distributed unequally among partners whoinvest different levels of resources themselves. Using new survey data onlobbying on 50 policy issues in five European countries, the article providesstrong support for these expectations: Active co-operation on an issueincreases lobbying success measured as perceived influence. Moreover, itmediates the effect of individual economic resources on lobbying success.These findings have important methodological and normative implicationsregarding alternatives pathways of lobbying power.

U2 - 10.1080/13501763.2019.1631377

DO - 10.1080/13501763.2019.1631377

M3 - Journal article

SN - 1350-1763

JO - Journal of European Public Policy

JF - Journal of European Public Policy

ER -