TY - JOUR
T1 - Binary effectivity rules
AU - Keiding, Hans
AU - Peleg, Bezalel
N1 - JEL Classification: D71, C70
PY - 2006
Y1 - 2006
N2 - Abstract A social choice rule (SCR) is a collection of social choice correspondences, one for each agenda. An effectivity rule is a collection of effectivity functions, one for each agenda. We prove that every monotonic and superadditive effectivity rule is the effectivity rule of some SCR. A SCR is binary if it is rationalized by an acyclic binary relation. The foregoing result motivates our definition of a binary effectivity rule as the effectivity rule of some binary SCR. A binary SCR is regular if it satisfies unanimity, monotonicity, and independence of infeasible alternatives. A binary effectivity rule is regular if it is the effectivity rule of some regular binary SCR. We characterize completely the family of regular binary effectivity rules. Quite surprisingly, intrinsically defined von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions play an important role in this characterization
AB - Abstract A social choice rule (SCR) is a collection of social choice correspondences, one for each agenda. An effectivity rule is a collection of effectivity functions, one for each agenda. We prove that every monotonic and superadditive effectivity rule is the effectivity rule of some SCR. A SCR is binary if it is rationalized by an acyclic binary relation. The foregoing result motivates our definition of a binary effectivity rule as the effectivity rule of some binary SCR. A binary SCR is regular if it satisfies unanimity, monotonicity, and independence of infeasible alternatives. A binary effectivity rule is regular if it is the effectivity rule of some regular binary SCR. We characterize completely the family of regular binary effectivity rules. Quite surprisingly, intrinsically defined von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions play an important role in this characterization
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - effectivity functions
KW - Von Neumann–Morgenstern
KW - game forms
U2 - 10.1007/s10058-006-0012-1
DO - 10.1007/s10058-006-0012-1
M3 - Journal article
SN - 1434-4742
VL - 10
SP - 167
EP - 181
JO - Review of Economic Design
JF - Review of Economic Design
IS - 3
ER -