Avian influenza

null EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare; Simon More; Dominique Bicout; Anette Bøtner; Andrew Butterworth; Paolo Calistri; Klaus Depner; Sandra Edwards; Bruno Garin-Bastuji; Margaret Good; Christian Gortázar Schmidt; Virginie Michel; Miguel Angel Miranda; Søren Saxmose Nielsen; Mohan Raj; Liisa Sihvonen; Hans Spoolder; Hans-Hermann Thulke; Antonio Velarde; Preben Willeberg; Christoph Winckler; Andrew Breed; Adam Brouwer; Matthieu Guillemain; Timm Harder; Isabella Monne; Helen Roberts; Francesca Baldinelli; Federica Barrucci; Chiara Fabris; Laura Martino; Olaf Mosbach-Schulz; Frank Verdonck; Joana Morgado; Jan Arend Stegeman

doi:10.2903/j.efsa.2017.4991

Avian influenza

EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare, Simon More, Dominique Bicout, Anette Bøtner, Andrew Butterworth, Paolo Calistri, Klaus Depner, Sandra Edwards, Bruno Garin-Bastuji, Margaret Good, Christian Gortázar Schmidt, Virginie Michel, Miguel Angel Miranda, Søren Saxmose Nielsen, Mohan Raj, Liisa Sihvonen, Hans Spoolder, Hans-Hermann Thulke, Antonio Velarde, Preben WillebergChristoph Winckler, Andrew Breed, Adam Brouwer, Matthieu Guillemain, Timm Harder, Isabella Monne, Helen Roberts, Francesca Baldinelli, Federica Barrucci, Chiara Fabris, Laura Martino, Olaf Mosbach-Schulz, Frank Verdonck, Joana Morgado, Jan Arend Stegeman

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Abstract

Previous introductions of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) to the EU were most likely via migratory wild birds. A mathematical model has been developed which indicated that virus amplification and spread may take place when wild bird populations of sufficient size within EU become infected. Low pathogenic avian influenza virus (LPAIV) may reach similar maximum prevalence levels in wild bird populations to HPAIV but the risk of LPAIV infection of a poultry holding was estimated to be lower than that of HPAIV. Only few non-wild bird pathways were identified having a non-negligible risk of AI introduction. The transmission rate between animals within a flock is assessed to be higher for HPAIV than LPAIV. In very few cases, it could be proven that HPAI outbreaks were caused by intrinsic mutation of LPAIV to HPAIV but current knowledge does not allow a prediction as to if, and when this could occur. In gallinaceous poultry, passive surveillance through notification of suspicious clinical signs/mortality was identified as the most effective method for early detection of HPAI outbreaks. For effective surveillance in anseriform poultry, passive surveillance through notification of suspicious clinical signs/mortality needs to be accompanied by serological surveillance and/or a virological surveillance programme of birds found dead (bucket sampling). Serosurveillance is unfit for early warning of LPAI outbreaks at the individual holding level but could be effective in tracing clusters of LPAIV-infected holdings. In wild birds, passive surveillance is an appropriate method for HPAIV surveillance if the HPAIV infections are associated with mortality whereas active wild bird surveillance has a very low efficiency for detecting HPAIV. Experts estimated and emphasised the effect of implementing specific biosecurity measures on reducing the probability of AIV entering into a poultry holding. Human diligence is pivotal to select, implement and maintain specific, effective biosecurity measures.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Artikelnummer	e04991
Tidsskrift	E F S A Journal
Vol/bind	15
Udgave nummer	10
Antal sider	233
ISSN	1831-4732
DOI	https://doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2017.4991
Status	Udgivet - 2017

Emneord

avian influenza, introduction, spread, mutagenesis, surveillance, biosecurity, zoning

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10.2903/j.efsa.2017.4991Licens: CC BY-ND

Avian InfluenzaForlagets udgivne version, 18,2 MBLicens: CC BY-ND

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EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare, More, S., Bicout, D., Bøtner, A., Butterworth, A., Calistri, P., Depner, K., Edwards, S., Garin-Bastuji, B., Good, M., Gortázar Schmidt, C., Michel, V., Miranda, M. A., Nielsen, S. S., Raj, M., Sihvonen, L., Spoolder, H., Thulke, H-H., Velarde, A., ... Stegeman, J. A. (2017). Avian influenza. E F S A Journal, 15(10), [e04991]. https://doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2017.4991

EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare, More, S, Bicout, D, Bøtner, A, Butterworth, A, Calistri, P, Depner, K, Edwards, S, Garin-Bastuji, B, Good, M, Gortázar Schmidt, C, Michel, V, Miranda, MA, Nielsen, SS, Raj, M, Sihvonen, L, Spoolder, H, Thulke, H-H, Velarde, A, Willeberg, P, Winckler, C, Breed, A, Brouwer, A, Guillemain, M, Harder, T, Monne, I, Roberts, H, Baldinelli, F, Barrucci, F, Fabris, C, Martino, L, Mosbach-Schulz, O, Verdonck, F, Morgado, J & Stegeman, JA 2017, 'Avian influenza', E F S A Journal, bind 15, nr. 10, e04991. https://doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2017.4991

@article{f8f183a9d07f4064a816a879aa7acf0c,

title = "Avian influenza",

abstract = "Previous introductions of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) to the EU were most likely via migratory wild birds. A mathematical model has been developed which indicated that virus amplification and spread may take place when wild bird populations of sufficient size within EU become infected. Low pathogenic avian influenza virus (LPAIV) may reach similar maximum prevalence levels in wild bird populations to HPAIV but the risk of LPAIV infection of a poultry holding was estimated to be lower than that of HPAIV. Only few non-wild bird pathways were identified having a non-negligible risk of AI introduction. The transmission rate between animals within a flock is assessed to be higher for HPAIV than LPAIV. In very few cases, it could be proven that HPAI outbreaks were caused by intrinsic mutation of LPAIV to HPAIV but current knowledge does not allow a prediction as to if, and when this could occur. In gallinaceous poultry, passive surveillance through notification of suspicious clinical signs/mortality was identified as the most effective method for early detection of HPAI outbreaks. For effective surveillance in anseriform poultry, passive surveillance through notification of suspicious clinical signs/mortality needs to be accompanied by serological surveillance and/or a virological surveillance programme of birds found dead (bucket sampling). Serosurveillance is unfit for early warning of LPAI outbreaks at the individual holding level but could be effective in tracing clusters of LPAIV-infected holdings. In wild birds, passive surveillance is an appropriate method for HPAIV surveillance if the HPAIV infections are associated with mortality whereas active wild bird surveillance has a very low efficiency for detecting HPAIV. Experts estimated and emphasised the effect of implementing specific biosecurity measures on reducing the probability of AIV entering into a poultry holding. Human diligence is pivotal to select, implement and maintain specific, effective biosecurity measures.",

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author = "{EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare} and Simon More and Dominique Bicout and Anette B{\o}tner and Andrew Butterworth and Paolo Calistri and Klaus Depner and Sandra Edwards and Bruno Garin-Bastuji and Margaret Good and {Gort{\'a}zar Schmidt}, Christian and Virginie Michel and Miranda, {Miguel Angel} and Nielsen, {S{\o}ren Saxmose} and Mohan Raj and Liisa Sihvonen and Hans Spoolder and Hans-Hermann Thulke and Antonio Velarde and Preben Willeberg and Christoph Winckler and Andrew Breed and Adam Brouwer and Matthieu Guillemain and Timm Harder and Isabella Monne and Helen Roberts and Francesca Baldinelli and Federica Barrucci and Chiara Fabris and Laura Martino and Olaf Mosbach-Schulz and Frank Verdonck and Joana Morgado and Stegeman, {Jan Arend}",

year = "2017",

doi = "10.2903/j.efsa.2017.4991",

language = "English",

volume = "15",

journal = "E F S A Journal",

issn = "1831-4732",

publisher = "European Food Safety Authority (E F S A)",

number = "10",

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TY - JOUR

T1 - Avian influenza

AU - EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare, null

AU - More, Simon

AU - Bicout, Dominique

AU - Bøtner, Anette

AU - Butterworth, Andrew

AU - Calistri, Paolo

AU - Depner, Klaus

AU - Edwards, Sandra

AU - Garin-Bastuji, Bruno

AU - Good, Margaret

AU - Gortázar Schmidt, Christian

AU - Michel, Virginie

AU - Miranda, Miguel Angel

AU - Nielsen, Søren Saxmose

AU - Raj, Mohan

AU - Sihvonen, Liisa

AU - Spoolder, Hans

AU - Thulke, Hans-Hermann

AU - Velarde, Antonio

AU - Willeberg, Preben

AU - Winckler, Christoph

AU - Breed, Andrew

AU - Brouwer, Adam

AU - Guillemain, Matthieu

AU - Harder, Timm

AU - Monne, Isabella

AU - Roberts, Helen

AU - Baldinelli, Francesca

AU - Barrucci, Federica

AU - Fabris, Chiara

AU - Martino, Laura

AU - Mosbach-Schulz, Olaf

AU - Verdonck, Frank

AU - Morgado, Joana

AU - Stegeman, Jan Arend

PY - 2017

Y1 - 2017

N2 - Previous introductions of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) to the EU were most likely via migratory wild birds. A mathematical model has been developed which indicated that virus amplification and spread may take place when wild bird populations of sufficient size within EU become infected. Low pathogenic avian influenza virus (LPAIV) may reach similar maximum prevalence levels in wild bird populations to HPAIV but the risk of LPAIV infection of a poultry holding was estimated to be lower than that of HPAIV. Only few non-wild bird pathways were identified having a non-negligible risk of AI introduction. The transmission rate between animals within a flock is assessed to be higher for HPAIV than LPAIV. In very few cases, it could be proven that HPAI outbreaks were caused by intrinsic mutation of LPAIV to HPAIV but current knowledge does not allow a prediction as to if, and when this could occur. In gallinaceous poultry, passive surveillance through notification of suspicious clinical signs/mortality was identified as the most effective method for early detection of HPAI outbreaks. For effective surveillance in anseriform poultry, passive surveillance through notification of suspicious clinical signs/mortality needs to be accompanied by serological surveillance and/or a virological surveillance programme of birds found dead (bucket sampling). Serosurveillance is unfit for early warning of LPAI outbreaks at the individual holding level but could be effective in tracing clusters of LPAIV-infected holdings. In wild birds, passive surveillance is an appropriate method for HPAIV surveillance if the HPAIV infections are associated with mortality whereas active wild bird surveillance has a very low efficiency for detecting HPAIV. Experts estimated and emphasised the effect of implementing specific biosecurity measures on reducing the probability of AIV entering into a poultry holding. Human diligence is pivotal to select, implement and maintain specific, effective biosecurity measures.

AB - Previous introductions of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) to the EU were most likely via migratory wild birds. A mathematical model has been developed which indicated that virus amplification and spread may take place when wild bird populations of sufficient size within EU become infected. Low pathogenic avian influenza virus (LPAIV) may reach similar maximum prevalence levels in wild bird populations to HPAIV but the risk of LPAIV infection of a poultry holding was estimated to be lower than that of HPAIV. Only few non-wild bird pathways were identified having a non-negligible risk of AI introduction. The transmission rate between animals within a flock is assessed to be higher for HPAIV than LPAIV. In very few cases, it could be proven that HPAI outbreaks were caused by intrinsic mutation of LPAIV to HPAIV but current knowledge does not allow a prediction as to if, and when this could occur. In gallinaceous poultry, passive surveillance through notification of suspicious clinical signs/mortality was identified as the most effective method for early detection of HPAI outbreaks. For effective surveillance in anseriform poultry, passive surveillance through notification of suspicious clinical signs/mortality needs to be accompanied by serological surveillance and/or a virological surveillance programme of birds found dead (bucket sampling). Serosurveillance is unfit for early warning of LPAI outbreaks at the individual holding level but could be effective in tracing clusters of LPAIV-infected holdings. In wild birds, passive surveillance is an appropriate method for HPAIV surveillance if the HPAIV infections are associated with mortality whereas active wild bird surveillance has a very low efficiency for detecting HPAIV. Experts estimated and emphasised the effect of implementing specific biosecurity measures on reducing the probability of AIV entering into a poultry holding. Human diligence is pivotal to select, implement and maintain specific, effective biosecurity measures.

KW - avian influenza, introduction, spread, mutagenesis, surveillance, biosecurity, zoning

U2 - 10.2903/j.efsa.2017.4991

DO - 10.2903/j.efsa.2017.4991

M3 - Journal article

SN - 1831-4732

VL - 15

JO - E F S A Journal

JF - E F S A Journal

IS - 10

M1 - e04991

ER -

Avian influenza

Abstract

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