Are Causal Laws a Relic of Bygone Age?

TY - JOUR

T1 - Are Causal Laws a Relic of Bygone Age?

AU - Faye, Jan

PY - 2017/12/1

Y1 - 2017/12/1

N2 - Bertrand Russell once pointed out that modern science doesn’t deal with causal laws and that assuming otherwise is not only wrong but such thinking is erroneously thought to do no harm. However, looking into the scientific practice of simulation or experimentation reveals a general causal comprehension of physical processes. In this paper I trace causal experiences to the existence of innate causal capacity by which we organize sensory information. This capacity, I argue, is something we have got in virtue of natural selection as can be seen from experiments with intelligent animals like crows and chimpanzees. So understanding the empirical world is impossible without the use of causal categories. The reason why Russell believed that modern science does not refer to causal laws is, I think, because he argued that the laws of mathematical physics give us a non-causal description of reality. In contrast to such a claim I hold that theoretical laws are prescriptive rules of description rather than descriptions themselves.

AB - Bertrand Russell once pointed out that modern science doesn’t deal with causal laws and that assuming otherwise is not only wrong but such thinking is erroneously thought to do no harm. However, looking into the scientific practice of simulation or experimentation reveals a general causal comprehension of physical processes. In this paper I trace causal experiences to the existence of innate causal capacity by which we organize sensory information. This capacity, I argue, is something we have got in virtue of natural selection as can be seen from experiments with intelligent animals like crows and chimpanzees. So understanding the empirical world is impossible without the use of causal categories. The reason why Russell believed that modern science does not refer to causal laws is, I think, because he argued that the laws of mathematical physics give us a non-causal description of reality. In contrast to such a claim I hold that theoretical laws are prescriptive rules of description rather than descriptions themselves.

KW - Faculty of Humanities

KW - Causality

KW - Experience

KW - Biological evolution

KW - Laws of nature

KW - Scientific theories

KW - Bertrand Russell

U2 - 10.1007/s10516-017-9340-8

DO - 10.1007/s10516-017-9340-8

M3 - Journal article

SN - 1122-1151

VL - 27

SP - 653

EP - 666

JO - Axiomathes

JF - Axiomathes

IS - 6

ER -