Anti-Luck (Too Weak) Virtue Epistemology

TY - JOUR

T1 - Anti-Luck (Too Weak) Virtue Epistemology

AU - Broncano-Berrocal, Fernando

PY - 2014/8/1

Y1 - 2014/8/1

N2 - I argue that Duncan Pritchard’s anti-luck virtue epistemology is insufficient for knowledge. I show that Pritchard fails to achieve the aim that motivates his adoption of a virtue-theoretic condition in the first place: to guarantee the appropriate direction of fit that known beliefs have. Finally, I examine whether other virtue-theoretic accounts are able to explain what I call the direction of fit problem

AB - I argue that Duncan Pritchard’s anti-luck virtue epistemology is insufficient for knowledge. I show that Pritchard fails to achieve the aim that motivates his adoption of a virtue-theoretic condition in the first place: to guarantee the appropriate direction of fit that known beliefs have. Finally, I examine whether other virtue-theoretic accounts are able to explain what I call the direction of fit problem

U2 - 10.1007/s10670-013-9551-3

DO - 10.1007/s10670-013-9551-3

M3 - Journal article

SN - 0165-0106

VL - 79

SP - 733

EP - 754

JO - Erkenntnis

JF - Erkenntnis

IS - 4

ER -