Agency rivalry in a shared regulatory space and its impact on social welfare: the case of aquaculture regulation

Tenaw Gedefaw Abate; Rasmus Nielsen; Max Nielsen

doi:10.1080/13657305.2017.1334243

Agency rivalry in a shared regulatory space and its impact on social welfare: the case of aquaculture regulation

Tenaw Gedefaw Abate, Rasmus Nielsen, Max Nielsen

Sektion for Miljø og Naturressourcer

20 Citationer (Scopus)

Abstract

This article is grounded in public choice theory and develops a framework to explain how non-benevolent behavior on the part of public regulators and the resulting lack of collaboration between different agencies have been affecting aquaculture growth. Although regulators are assumed to work for the best interest of the people, they can have their own rational agendas; such as career advancement, self-aggrandizement and loyalty for a particular political ideology. We show that when officials are non-benevolent and agencies have unequal relative decision-making power, it is likely that a more powerful agency dictates policies in favor of its own agenda, even when such policies may not necessarily lead to optimal social welfare. In the case of aquaculture, higher relative power of a pro-environment agency leads to underdevelopment of the sector, as is the case in developed countries, whereas larger relative power of a pro-industry agency leads to higher growth, as is the case in developing countries.

Originalsprog	Dansk
Tidsskrift	Aquaculture Economics & Management
Vol/bind	22
Udgave nummer	1
Sider (fra-til)	27-48
Antal sider	22
ISSN	1365-7305
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1080/13657305.2017.1334243
Status	Udgivet - 2 jan. 2018

Adgang til dokumentet

10.1080/13657305.2017.1334243

Citationsformater

@article{44734a0d5e874b59b8eaaeddf36256d5,

title = "Agency rivalry in a shared regulatory space and its impact on social welfare: the case of aquaculture regulation",

abstract = "This article is grounded in public choice theory and develops a framework to explain how non-benevolent behavior on the part of public regulators and the resulting lack of collaboration between different agencies have been affecting aquaculture growth. Although regulators are assumed to work for the best interest of the people, they can have their own rational agendas; such as career advancement, self-aggrandizement and loyalty for a particular political ideology. We show that when officials are non-benevolent and agencies have unequal relative decision-making power, it is likely that a more powerful agency dictates policies in favor of its own agenda, even when such policies may not necessarily lead to optimal social welfare. In the case of aquaculture, higher relative power of a pro-environment agency leads to underdevelopment of the sector, as is the case in developed countries, whereas larger relative power of a pro-industry agency leads to higher growth, as is the case in developing countries.",

author = "{Gedefaw Abate}, Tenaw and Rasmus Nielsen and Max Nielsen",

year = "2018",

month = jan,

day = "2",

doi = "10.1080/13657305.2017.1334243",

language = "Dansk",

volume = "22",

pages = "27--48",

journal = "Aquaculture, Economics and Management",

issn = "1365-7305",

publisher = "Taylor & Francis",

number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Agency rivalry in a shared regulatory space and its impact on social welfare

T2 - the case of aquaculture regulation

AU - Gedefaw Abate, Tenaw

AU - Nielsen, Rasmus

AU - Nielsen, Max

PY - 2018/1/2

Y1 - 2018/1/2

N2 - This article is grounded in public choice theory and develops a framework to explain how non-benevolent behavior on the part of public regulators and the resulting lack of collaboration between different agencies have been affecting aquaculture growth. Although regulators are assumed to work for the best interest of the people, they can have their own rational agendas; such as career advancement, self-aggrandizement and loyalty for a particular political ideology. We show that when officials are non-benevolent and agencies have unequal relative decision-making power, it is likely that a more powerful agency dictates policies in favor of its own agenda, even when such policies may not necessarily lead to optimal social welfare. In the case of aquaculture, higher relative power of a pro-environment agency leads to underdevelopment of the sector, as is the case in developed countries, whereas larger relative power of a pro-industry agency leads to higher growth, as is the case in developing countries.

AB - This article is grounded in public choice theory and develops a framework to explain how non-benevolent behavior on the part of public regulators and the resulting lack of collaboration between different agencies have been affecting aquaculture growth. Although regulators are assumed to work for the best interest of the people, they can have their own rational agendas; such as career advancement, self-aggrandizement and loyalty for a particular political ideology. We show that when officials are non-benevolent and agencies have unequal relative decision-making power, it is likely that a more powerful agency dictates policies in favor of its own agenda, even when such policies may not necessarily lead to optimal social welfare. In the case of aquaculture, higher relative power of a pro-environment agency leads to underdevelopment of the sector, as is the case in developed countries, whereas larger relative power of a pro-industry agency leads to higher growth, as is the case in developing countries.

U2 - 10.1080/13657305.2017.1334243

DO - 10.1080/13657305.2017.1334243

M3 - Tidsskriftartikel

SN - 1365-7305

VL - 22

SP - 27

EP - 48

JO - Aquaculture, Economics and Management

JF - Aquaculture, Economics and Management

IS - 1

ER -