A model of public opinion management

Andrea Patacconi; Nicholas Edward Vikander

doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.05.002

A model of public opinion management

Andrea Patacconi, Nicholas Edward Vikander

1 Citationer (Scopus)

Abstract

Policymakers often motivate their decisions using information collected by government agencies. While more information can help hold the government to account, it may also give policymakers an incentive to meddle with the work of bureaucrats. This paper develops a model of biased information gathering to examine how different disclosure rules and the degree of independence of government agencies affect citizen welfare. Disclosure rules and agency independence interact in subtle ways. We find that secrecy is never optimal and yet insulating the agency from political pressure, so that its information is always unbiased, may also not be socially optimal. A biased information-gathering process can benefit the government by helping it to shape public opinion. But it can also benefit the public, by curbing the government's tendency to implement its ex ante favored policy, thus mitigating the agency conflict between policymakers and the public.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Tidsskrift	Journal of Public Economics
Vol/bind	128
Sider (fra-til)	73-83
ISSN	0047-2727
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.05.002
Status	Udgivet - 1 aug. 2015

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10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.05.002Licens: Ikke-specificeret

Citationsformater

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N2 - Policymakers often motivate their decisions using information collected by government agencies. While more information can help hold the government to account, it may also give policymakers an incentive to meddle with the work of bureaucrats. This paper develops a model of biased information gathering to examine how different disclosure rules and the degree of independence of government agencies affect citizen welfare. Disclosure rules and agency independence interact in subtle ways. We find that secrecy is never optimal and yet insulating the agency from political pressure, so that its information is always unbiased, may also not be socially optimal. A biased information-gathering process can benefit the government by helping it to shape public opinion. But it can also benefit the public, by curbing the government's tendency to implement its ex ante favored policy, thus mitigating the agency conflict between policymakers and the public.

AB - Policymakers often motivate their decisions using information collected by government agencies. While more information can help hold the government to account, it may also give policymakers an incentive to meddle with the work of bureaucrats. This paper develops a model of biased information gathering to examine how different disclosure rules and the degree of independence of government agencies affect citizen welfare. Disclosure rules and agency independence interact in subtle ways. We find that secrecy is never optimal and yet insulating the agency from political pressure, so that its information is always unbiased, may also not be socially optimal. A biased information-gathering process can benefit the government by helping it to shape public opinion. But it can also benefit the public, by curbing the government's tendency to implement its ex ante favored policy, thus mitigating the agency conflict between policymakers and the public.

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DO - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.05.002

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VL - 128

SP - 73

EP - 83

JO - Journal of Public Economics

JF - Journal of Public Economics

ER -

A model of public opinion management

Abstract

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