A Formal Model of Corruption, Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service

TY - UNPB

T1 - A Formal Model of Corruption, Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service

AU - Barfort, Sebastian

AU - Harmon, Nikolaj Arpe

AU - Hjorth, Frederik Georg

AU - Olsen, Asmus Leth

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - Recent empirical studies have found that in high corruption countries, inherently moredishonest individuals are more likely to want to enter into public service, while the reverseis true in low corruption countries. In this note, we provide a simple formal model thatrationalizes this empirical pattern as the result of countries being stuck in different selfsustainingequilibria where high levels of corruption and negative selection into publicservice are mutually reinforcing.

AB - Recent empirical studies have found that in high corruption countries, inherently moredishonest individuals are more likely to want to enter into public service, while the reverseis true in low corruption countries. In this note, we provide a simple formal model thatrationalizes this empirical pattern as the result of countries being stuck in different selfsustainingequilibria where high levels of corruption and negative selection into publicservice are mutually reinforcing.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - corruption

KW - dishonesty

KW - public service motivation

KW - experiments

KW - dice game method

M3 - Working paper

BT - A Formal Model of Corruption, Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service

ER -