Optimal Management under Asymmetric Information: A Principal-Agent Analysis of a User Fee on Fishing Days

    Aktivitet: Tale eller præsentation - typer › Foredrag og mundtlige bidrag

    Beskrivelse

    In the economic literature on fisheries management complete information is normally assumed. In reality fishermen have more information than the regulatory authority. In the present paper a principal-agent approach is applied to analyse management with a user fee on fishing days under asymmetric information about the skill of fishermen (productivity) and fishing effort apart from fishing days. The results implies that if the optimal resource rent in fisheries shall be achieved it is necessary to deal with stock externalities and asymmetric information simultaneously. Management with a user fee on fishing days does that and reach an optimal situation.
    Periode10 jul. 2007
    BegivenhedstitelXVIII Annual Conference of the European Association of Fisheries Economists
    BegivenhedstypeKonference
    Konferencenummer18
    ArrangørCentral Bank
    PlaceringReykjavic, IslandVis på kort