Non-Compliance in Fisheries: A Corporate Crime Perspective

Beskrivelse

Non-compliance with fisheries regulations occurs in most commercial fisheries. In the traditional fisheries economics law enforcement literature, this is dealt with by treating the fishing firm as one cohesive unit or individual. The fishing firm is typically assumed to violate a regulation if the expected gains are larger than the expected fine/punishment associated with the violation. However, in many cases violations are not committed by an individual, but by agents acting on behalf of an owner or a collective entity. This calls for analysing the principal-agent relationship of the fishing firm and integrating this into an economic model of crime. We analyse the case in which the employees (the crew and skipper) do not necessarily obtain any direct benefits from corporate crime. The owner of the fishing firm may, on the other hand, benefit from such activity. Hence, the compensation scheme facing the employees may be set up to induce them to commit offences. In this paper, we analyse these aspects of non-compliance in fisheries and implications for enforcement. We ask who should be held liable for non-compliance in fishing firms, and show how appropriate selection of quotas, fines and liability rules can ensure optimality (social optimum).