Wahrnehmung und Explikation: Husserl und Stein über die Phänomenologie der Einfühlung

James Alexander Jardine

doi:10.1515/dzph-2016-0028

Wahrnehmung und Explikation: Husserl und Stein über die Phänomenologie der Einfühlung

James Alexander Jardine

Department of Communication

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Within the phenomenological tradition, one frequently finds the bold claim that interpersonal understanding is rooted in a sui generis form of intentional experience, most commonly labelled empathy (Einfühlung). The following paper explores this claim, emphasizing its distinctive character, and examining the phenomenological considerations offered in its defence by two of its main proponents, Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein. Having offered in section 2 some preliminary indications of how empathy should be understood, I then turn to some characterizations of its distinctive structure, considering, in section 3, the Husserlian claim that certain forms of empathy are perceptual in nature, and in section 4, Stein's insistence that empathetic experience frequently involves explicating the other's own intentional experiences. Section 5 will conclude by assessing the extent to which their analyses lend support to a conception of empathy as an intuitive experience of other minds.

Original language	German
Journal	Deutsche Zeitschrift fuer Philosophie
Volume	64
Issue number	3
Pages (from-to)	352-374
Number of pages	23
ISSN	0012-1045
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2016-0028
Publication status	Published - 1 Jun 2016

Keywords

Faculty of Humanities

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10.1515/dzph-2016-0028

Cite this

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title = "Wahrnehmung und Explikation: Husserl und Stein {\"u}ber die Ph{\"a}nomenologie der Einf{\"u}hlung",

abstract = "Within the phenomenological tradition, one frequently finds the bold claim that interpersonal understanding is rooted in a sui generis form of intentional experience, most commonly labelled empathy (Einf{\"u}hlung). The following paper explores this claim, emphasizing its distinctive character, and examining the phenomenological considerations offered in its defence by two of its main proponents, Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein. Having offered in section 2 some preliminary indications of how empathy should be understood, I then turn to some characterizations of its distinctive structure, considering, in section 3, the Husserlian claim that certain forms of empathy are perceptual in nature, and in section 4, Stein's insistence that empathetic experience frequently involves explicating the other's own intentional experiences. Section 5 will conclude by assessing the extent to which their analyses lend support to a conception of empathy as an intuitive experience of other minds.",

keywords = "Det Humanistiske Fakultet, empathy, perception, interpersonal understanding, Edmund Husserl, Edith Stein",

author = "Jardine, {James Alexander}",

note = "German translation of my 2015 Synthesis Philosophica article.",

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N2 - Within the phenomenological tradition, one frequently finds the bold claim that interpersonal understanding is rooted in a sui generis form of intentional experience, most commonly labelled empathy (Einfühlung). The following paper explores this claim, emphasizing its distinctive character, and examining the phenomenological considerations offered in its defence by two of its main proponents, Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein. Having offered in section 2 some preliminary indications of how empathy should be understood, I then turn to some characterizations of its distinctive structure, considering, in section 3, the Husserlian claim that certain forms of empathy are perceptual in nature, and in section 4, Stein's insistence that empathetic experience frequently involves explicating the other's own intentional experiences. Section 5 will conclude by assessing the extent to which their analyses lend support to a conception of empathy as an intuitive experience of other minds.

AB - Within the phenomenological tradition, one frequently finds the bold claim that interpersonal understanding is rooted in a sui generis form of intentional experience, most commonly labelled empathy (Einfühlung). The following paper explores this claim, emphasizing its distinctive character, and examining the phenomenological considerations offered in its defence by two of its main proponents, Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein. Having offered in section 2 some preliminary indications of how empathy should be understood, I then turn to some characterizations of its distinctive structure, considering, in section 3, the Husserlian claim that certain forms of empathy are perceptual in nature, and in section 4, Stein's insistence that empathetic experience frequently involves explicating the other's own intentional experiences. Section 5 will conclude by assessing the extent to which their analyses lend support to a conception of empathy as an intuitive experience of other minds.

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KW - perception

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KW - Edmund Husserl

KW - Edith Stein

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