The Deterrence Effect of Whistleblowing

Niels Johannesen, Tim Stolper

    Abstract

    We document that the first leak of customer information from a tax haven bank caused a signifficant decrease in the market value of Swiss banks known to be assisting with tax evasion and that the decrease was largest for the banks most strongly involved. These findings suggest that markets expected the leak to increase the perceived risk of committing and assisting with tax evasion and thus to lower both demand and supply in the market for criminal offshore banking services. This interpretation finds support in further evidence that the leak caused a sharp drop in foreign-owned deposits in tax havens.
    Original languageEnglish
    Number of pages38
    Publication statusPublished - 2017
    SeriesEPRU Working Paper Series
    Number1
    Volume2017
    ISSN0908-7745

    Keywords

    • Faculty of Social Sciences
    • whistleblowing
    • economic crime
    • tax evasion
    • tax havens

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