Similarity Arguments in the Genetic Modification Debate

Andreas Christiansen

Abstract

In the ethical debate on genetic modification (GM), it is common to encounter the claim that some anti-GM argument would also apply an established, ethically accepted technology, and that the anti-GM argument is therefore unsuccessful. The paper discusses whether this argumentative strategy, the Similarity Argument, is sound. It presents a logically valid, generic form of the Similarity Argument and then shows that it is subject to three types of objection: (i) It does not respect the difference between pro tanto reasons and all-things-considered judgments; (ii) it relies on the unproblematic transferability of reasons from one case to another; and (iii) it runs the risk of equivocations, especially in cases where the anti-genetic-modification argument relies on gradable features. The paper then shows how these issues play out in three specific Similarity Arguments that can be found in the literature. Finally, the paper discusses what conclusions we can draw from the fact that genetic modification and established technologies are similar for the ethical status of genetic modification.
Original languageEnglish
JournalEthical Theory and Moral Practice
Volume20
Issue number2
Pages (from-to)239-255
Number of pages17
ISSN1386-2820
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Apr 2017

Keywords

  • Faculty of Humanities
  • Genetic engineering
  • Ethics
  • Particularism
  • Analogy
  • Bioethics
  • Environmental ethics

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  • PhD Forum in Practical Philosophy

    Andreas Christiansen (Invited speaker)

    20 May 2015

    Activity: Participating in or organising an event typesOrganisation of and participation in conference

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