Abstract
I argue against the view that an agent’s knowledge of her own current action cannot in any way rely on perception for its justification. Instead, I argue that when it comes to an agent’s knowledge of her own object-oriented intentional action, the agent’s belief about what she is doing is partly justified by her perception of the object of action. I proceed by first proposing an account of such actions according to which the agent’s knowledge is partly justified by her perception. I then discuss several of objections to my proposal. The most important objection is that I have only managed to show that perception plays an enabling role and not a justificatory role for the agent’s knowledge of her own intentional action
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |
| Volume | 86 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| Pages (from-to) | 295-318 |
| Number of pages | 24 |
| ISSN | 0031-8205 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Mar 2013 |
Keywords
- Faculty of Humanities