Abstract
For Kierkegaard, being oneself involves becoming and overcoming oneself, since self-knowledge is acquired in a painful process of getting to know oneself-a process that might also reveal what one would prefer not to know about oneself. According to Kierkegaard, self-deception is the most common reaction. Philosophers of psychology discuss about whether self-deceiving action is intentional, whether it is paradoxical, and whether self-deceivers are morally responsible for self-deception. This paper aims to spotlight oversimplifications in the current debate. Kierkegaard's account of self-deception brings into focus what is ignored in recent accounts: the ambiguity of the will in its interrelation with knowing and feeling, the struggle with oneself, and the complexity of orienting and presenting oneself authentically in a social setting.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Kierkegaard Studies.Yearbook |
| Publisher | De Gruyter |
| Publication date | 16 Nov 2011 |
| Pages | 157-180 |
| ISBN (Print) | 3110236508 |
| Publication status | Published - 16 Nov 2011 |