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Incentive contracts with unobservable competence levels
Jerome Davis,
Hans Keiding
Department of Economics
576
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Dive into the research topics of 'Incentive contracts with unobservable competence levels'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.
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Business & Economics
Alternatives
5%
Hidden Information
16%
Incentive Contracts
100%
Obligation
10%
Optimal Contract
13%
Performance
4%
Reputation Mechanism
16%