Give and Take in Dictator Games

Alexander W. Cappelen; Ulrik Haagen Nielsen; Erik Ø. Sørensen; Bertil Tungodden; Jean-Robert Karl Tyran

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2012.10.030

Give and Take in Dictator Games

Alexander W. Cappelen, Ulrik Haagen Nielsen, Erik Ø. Sørensen, Bertil Tungodden, Jean-Robert Karl Tyran

Department of Economics

41 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

It has been shown that participants in the dictator game are less willing to give money to the other participant when their choice set also includes the option to take money. We examine whether this effect is due to the choice set providing a signal about entitlements in a setting where entitlements initially may be considered unclear. We find that the share of positive transfers depends on the choice set even when there is no uncertainty about entitlements, and that this choice-set effect is robust across a heterogenous group of participants recruited from the general adult population in Denmark. The findings are consistent with dictator giving partly being motivated by a desire to signal that one is not entirely selfish or by a desire to follow a social norm that is choice-set dependent.

Original language	English
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	118
Issue number	2
Pages (from-to)	280–283
Number of pages	4
ISSN	0165-1765
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.10.030
Publication status	Published - Feb 2013

Keywords

Faculty of Social Sciences
Dictator game
Choice set
Social preferences
Experiments

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title = "Give and Take in Dictator Games",

abstract = "It has been shown that participants in the dictator game are less willing to give money to the other participant when their choice set also includes the option to take money. We examine whether this effect is due to the choice set providing a signal about entitlements in a setting where entitlements initially may be considered unclear. We find that the share of positive transfers depends on the choice set even when there is no uncertainty about entitlements, and that this choice-set effect is robust across a heterogenous group of participants recruited from the general adult population in Denmark. The findings are consistent with dictator giving partly being motivated by a desire to signal that one is not entirely selfish or by a desire to follow a social norm that is choice-set dependent.",

keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, Dictator game, Choice set, Social preferences, Experiments",

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T1 - Give and Take in Dictator Games

AU - Cappelen, Alexander W.

AU - Nielsen, Ulrik Haagen

AU - Sørensen, Erik Ø.

AU - Tungodden, Bertil

AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl

N1 - JEL classification: C91; D63

PY - 2013/2

Y1 - 2013/2

N2 - It has been shown that participants in the dictator game are less willing to give money to the other participant when their choice set also includes the option to take money. We examine whether this effect is due to the choice set providing a signal about entitlements in a setting where entitlements initially may be considered unclear. We find that the share of positive transfers depends on the choice set even when there is no uncertainty about entitlements, and that this choice-set effect is robust across a heterogenous group of participants recruited from the general adult population in Denmark. The findings are consistent with dictator giving partly being motivated by a desire to signal that one is not entirely selfish or by a desire to follow a social norm that is choice-set dependent.

AB - It has been shown that participants in the dictator game are less willing to give money to the other participant when their choice set also includes the option to take money. We examine whether this effect is due to the choice set providing a signal about entitlements in a setting where entitlements initially may be considered unclear. We find that the share of positive transfers depends on the choice set even when there is no uncertainty about entitlements, and that this choice-set effect is robust across a heterogenous group of participants recruited from the general adult population in Denmark. The findings are consistent with dictator giving partly being motivated by a desire to signal that one is not entirely selfish or by a desire to follow a social norm that is choice-set dependent.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - Dictator game

KW - Choice set

KW - Social preferences

KW - Experiments

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.10.030

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.10.030

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VL - 118

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EP - 283

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

IS - 2

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Give and Take in Dictator Games

Abstract

Keywords

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